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I. INTRODUCTION
The franchisee-franchisor relationship has often been referred to as the 
little guy against the big guy.1  Franchising may encompass the seemingly 
innocuous defining characteristics of distribution, know-how, brand 
identification, profits, risk, independence, control, and standards,2 but 
there is much more to this relational contract.3  If parties enter into a
franchise or licensing agreement rather than some other business
agreement,4 this does not necessarily insulate the parties from liability.
For example, simply because the parties have formed a franchisor-
franchisee relationship does not mean the parties did not also form
1. See Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 375 (Ct. App.
1996) (discussing the franchisee-franchisor relationship in terms of the “small-business 
person” against the “whip of a giant”).
2. Franchising has been defined as 
a system for the selective distribution of goods and/or services under a brand
name through outlets owned by independent businessmen, called “franchisees.”  
Although the franchisor supplies the franchisee with know-how and brand 
identification on a continuing basis, the franchisee enjoys the right to profit 
and runs the risk of loss.  The franchisor controls the distribution of his goods 
and/or services through a contract which regulates activities of franchisee, in 
order to achieve standardization. 
ROBERT ROSENBERG WITH MADELON BEDELL, PROFITS FROM FRANCHISING 41 (1969).
Over four decades later, the definition remains accurate, although arguably incomplete. 
One can say that franchising is a business relationship based on contract law in which a
franchised business, the franchisor, grants a franchisee the right to use its trademarks and 
proprietary information in exchange for royalties. For an extensive treatment of how 
franchising is defined, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and
the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REV. 905, 908 n.l (1994);
Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 1503, 1506 n.l, 1508–09 (1990).  For a discussion on the growth and maturation of
franchising, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 194– 
201 (2010).
3. Franchise contracts are relational contracts in that they rarely spell out the 
details of the franchisor-franchisee transactions and are, in fact, “necessarily incomplete.” 
Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete
Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 946, 953 (1990); see also  ELIZABETH CRAWFORD 
SPENCER, THE REGULATION OF FRANCHISING IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 84–87 
(2010) (discussing how parties cannot reduce the franchise’s important terms to well-
defined obligations). Courts usually refuse to declare these contract’s silent or indefinite
terms invalid and instead “look beyond the document [to] identify a configuration of
commitments patterned not in the words of the contract but in the underlying relation 
itself.”  Hadfield, supra, at 979–80; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 65–66 (1963) (discussing franchising as
an example of relational contracting); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and 
Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 506 (referring to “highly relational patterns such 
as franchise agreements”).
4. For example, forming a joint venture or a general or limited partnership, or
incorporating a business. 
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an agent-principal (agency) relationship. In addition to the franchise
relationship, the latter may be formed, intentionally or unintentionally, if 
the franchise contract “so ‘regulates the activities of the franchisee’ as to
vest the franchisor with control within the definition of agency.”5  In that
case, the agency relationship arises even if a party expressly denies its
formation.6 
Assuming that the parties did not form an agency relationship, then
case law interpreting the contractual relationship largely governs the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship.7  Under contract law, courts have
been quite reluctant to find that franchise agreements establish fiduciary 
duties between the parties.8  Only a small minority of courts has found
that as a matter of law a fiduciary relationship exists between a franchisor 
and a franchisee.9  Defining what duties a franchisor potentially owes to
a franchisee is essential to understanding the dynamics of the franchisor-
franchisee relationship, especially if the franchisee is “David” facing the 
“Goliath” franchisor. Still, the more perplexing question about those 
franchisor duties is: Does the franchisor, or even the franchisor’s attorney, 
5. Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 877 (Va. 1975) (quoting 
ROSENBERG WITH BEDELL, supra note 2, at 41).  Agency is defined as “the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person—a “principal”—manifests assent to another
person—an “agent”—that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the 
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).  Numerous courts have discussed three 
defining characteristics of an agency relationship: (1) the agent acts on behalf of the 
principal; (2) the principal consents, expressly or implicitly, to the agent’s actions; and 
(3) the agent is subject to the control, or right of control, of the principal. See, e.g., A. 
Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290–91 (Minn. 1981); Norris v. 
Cox, 2001-CA-00087-COA (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). 
6. Murphy, 219 S.E.2d at 877 (holding that the relationship of the parties does
not depend upon what the parties themselves call it but rather in law what it actually is, 
and that in determining whether a contract establishes an agency relationship, the critical
test is the nature and extent of the control agreed upon). 
7. See David Gurnick & Steve Vieux, Case History of the American Business 
Franchise, 24 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 37, 50 (1999) (“A franchise is a relationship 
established by a contract.  The contract is formed, interpreted, and governed by the rules 
of contract law.”). 
8. See, e.g., Akkaya v. Prime Time Transp., Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 827, 828 (App. 
Div. 2007); Marcella & Co. v. Avon Prods., Inc., 724 N.Y.S.2d 192, 193 (App. Div. 2001); 
Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1992); 
Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings, L.L.C., 223 S.W.3d 676, 690 (Tex. App. 2007). 
9. See, e.g., Arnott v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1979); ABA
Distribs., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 542 F. Supp. 1272, 1286–87 (W.D. Mo. 1982);






   











     
   
   
 





owe an unrepresented franchisee an additional duty of care during the 
negotiation process?  This difficult proposition is a focus of this Article. 
A. A Need To Protect Franchisees?
Consider the history of franchising.  After World War II, the 
entrepreneurial ideal of owning one’s own business helped to create a
franchise boom.10  By the 1970s, the need for legislation to regulate
franchises became apparent.11  As the value of and growth in heavily 
franchised sectors tapered off or even plummeted, franchisees often
sought redress from franchisors.12  A common theme emerged: “fly-by-
night franchisors” caused “mom-and-pop franchisees” to lose their life 
savings by investing in worthless franchises.13  In the 1970s, the typical 
franchisee was viewed as an inexperienced businessperson attempting to 
10. See William L. Killion, The Modern Myth of the Vulnerable Franchisee: The 
Case for a More Balanced View of the Franchisor-Franchisee Relationship, 28 
FRANCHISE L.J. 23, 24 (2008) (citing THOMAS S. DICKE, FRANCHISING IN AMERICA: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A BUSINESS METHOD, 1840-1980, at 124, 126 (1992)).  By purchasing
a franchise, a franchisee was able to combine “the economic efficiency of big business 
with the personal satisfaction and social advantages of small business ownership.”  Id. 
(citing DICKE, supra, at 126).
11. See id. at 26; see also Rupert M. Barkoff, Franchise Sales Regulation Reform: 
Taking the Noose Off the Golden Goose, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 233, 238 (2009)
(stating that an increase in franchisor fraud in the 1960s received publicity and led to a 
call for regulation as the 1970s commenced); Thomas M. Pitegoff, Franchise Relationship 
Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, in BUILDING FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIPS: A GUIDE TO 
ANTICIPATING PROBLEMS, RESOLVING CONFLICTS, AND REPRESENTING CLIENTS 140, 141 
(Ann Hurwitz & Rochelle Buchsbaum Spandorf eds., 1996) (concluding that, “[t]he real 
surge in legislation came in the 1970s as a reaction to early abuses by some unscrupulous 
franchisors”). 
12. Several factors led to the decline in the franchise business, including the 
declining stock market, the fact that many franchisors “recorded their entire initial franchise 
fee as income the day the franchise agreement was signed,” and the emergence of the 
celebrity franchisor.  See Killion, supra note 10, at 26.  These lawsuits were commonly 
filed as class actions against the franchisor. Id.
13. Id.; 1 W. MICHAEL GARNER, FRANCHISE AND DISTRIBUTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 1:10 (2013) (noting that the first state law requiring franchisor disclosure to 
prospective franchisees, California’s 1970 statute,” was adopted in the wake of widespread
newspaper stories . . . concerning individuals who had invested their life savings in
franchises only to discover that the franchises were not what had been promised.”).
Former New York Attorney General Louis Lefkowitz characterized the franchising 
business as “fly-by-night operations often with nothing more substantial than fancy
multi-color brochures”; “citizens of this state are surrendering their life savings to buy 
worthless franchises”; and “criminal elements and high pressure salesmen have infiltrated into
the franchise business.”  Killion, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting Memorandum from David 
Clurman to Attorney General Lefkowitz (Jan. 7, 1970) (reproduced in The Impact of 
Franchising on Small Business: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Urban and Rural 
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achieve the American dream.14  Some of these business babes in the
woods invested their life savings with a crooked franchisor, “only to see 
everything [their dream and their money] evaporate.”15 
As a result of the decline in franchising markets, as well as the mounting 
reputation of franchisors as dishonest businesspersons looking to swindle 
investors, state legislation and federal rulemaking attempted to police 
franchisor representations and, in some cases, the franchisor-franchisee 
contract.16  However, some commentators contend that today’s franchisee
is not the unsophisticated investor of the 1970s.17  For one thing, he has
access to much more information about franchised enterprises than 
franchisees did forty years ago.18  Certainly, some empirical evidence
supports this contention that franchisees have increasingly acquired some
degree of business and legal sophistication.19 
Thus, many argue that there is no longer a need for allegedly paternalistic
legislation to protect the unwary franchisee,20 that “[f]ranchise legislation 
and regulations have achieved their goal,”21 and that, in light of the
sophistication of today’s franchisee22 and the amount of information
14. The franchisee was further characterized as a person with no business experience
at all “but perhaps a plumber or electrician who has been told he needs no experience to
profit handsomely and that the enfranchiser will teach him all he needs to know.” 
Killion, supra note 10, at 27 (quoting James MacGregor, Bursting Bubble: Many Franchise
Firms Fall on Hard Times After a 15-Year Boom, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1970, at 1). 
15. Id. (quoting MacGregor, supra note 14, at 1). 
16. See id. at 27–28 (discussing the federal and state regulations of the franchise 
industry). 
17. Id. at 28. 
18. Id. at 29. Killion insists that it is a “myth” that franchisees are vulnerable, and
posits that this fiction is premised on two outdated assumptions: (1) “that franchisees are 
generally naïve and unsophisticated in comparison to franchisors and, therefore, need
special protection from opportunistic conduct by comparably large franchisors”; and (2) 
“that there is a ‘gross bargaining disparity’ between the franchisor and franchisee resulting in
one-sided franchise agreements that allow franchisors to control unfairly the fortunes of
their franchisees.” Id. at 23. 
19. See infra Appendix, Copy of Survey Instrument, Question 12 [hereinafter 
Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey]. But see infra Parts II.A and II.B for a discussion
of how franchisees still often know little and do not get lawyers who could assist them. 
20. See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the 
Franchise Relationship, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 105, 106–07 (2004) (discussing the opinion of
many franchisors and their advocates that previous legislation has successfully addressed 
the concern of, and concern for, franchisees). 
21. Killion, supra note 10, at 29. 
22. See Am. Bar Ass’n Forum on Franchising, Thirty Years of Franchising, 27
































provided to the franchisee before signing any agreement, contemporary
franchisees are no longer vulnerable investors.23 
While earlier franchisors may have had the upper hand during 
negotiations, today’s sophisticated franchisees may dominate, or so the 
theory holds: The franchisee can go “franchise shopping” to see where 
the best opportunities for the best prices lie.24  Along these lines, 
commentators dispute the presumption that franchisors present franchise
agreements to franchisees on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.25  These
commentators go on to contend that the parties’ willingness to enter a 
franchise agreement—sometimes spanning up to thirty years—shows 
that the franchisee, not just the franchisor, must have had a say in the 
agreement’s terms.26 
If today’s franchisee is indeed savvier, better informed, and armed
with more bargaining power than the franchisees a generation ago,27 one
other necessary premise still remains for arguing that franchisors and 
prospective franchisees really do meet as relative equals in the
bargaining process. That is, in the highly complex world of franchised
businesses, both sides having effective counsel.  Business acumen and 
experience are necessary, but alone are insufficient to put franchisees on 
an even footing with franchisors represented by counsel. Surely, 
franchisors understand that, despite their own often-formidable business 
experience and talent, excellent legal counsel is also crucial to their
success. Franchisors universally retain lawyers for the most fundamental
franchisors and franchisees in the “evaluation of their legal rights” in response to past
litigation).  There are many examples of cases in which courts noted the franchisee was 
sophisticated. See, e.g., Dunkin’ Donuts Franchised Rests. LLC v. Manassas Donut Inc., 
No. 1:07cv446 (JCC), 2008 WL 110474, at *3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2008) (holding that 
waivers franchisee signed are enforceable because franchisee was an “experienced 
franchisee” who made a conscious decision not to seek counsel before signing the
franchise agreement); PostNet Int’l Franchise Corp. v. Amercis Int’l, Inc., No. 06-CV-
00125-PSF-BNB, 2006 WL 1775599, at *3 (D. Colo. June 26, 2006) (holding that a 
waiver was enforceable against a franchisee who consciously did not seek counsel before
signing the franchise agreement); Papa John’s Int’l, Inc. v. Dynamic Pizza, Inc., 317 F. 
Supp. 2d 740, 748 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (holding, in part, that the franchisee’s sophistication
negated a claim of fraud by the franchisor in the negotiation of a franchise agreement). 
23. See Killion, supra note 10, at 29 (noting that the disclosures to prospective
franchisees furnish quite helpful tools for evaluating an investment, including obtaining 
even more data by examining the franchisor’s litigation history and even questioning
existing franchisees).
24. See id. 
25. Id. at 30 (arguing that “the typical franchise agreement is anything but 
unconscionable”). 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 31 (opining that courts should stop “bail[ing] franchisees out of bad
business decisions under an assumption that franchisees are collectively naïve or 
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tasks in the franchise relationship—drafting and enforcing the franchise 
agreement.28  If franchisors know that they need counseling and act on
that presumption, then they cannot deny that franchisees, too, must need 
lawyers in similar ways, such as to evaluate and negotiate work related
to prospective franchise contracts.  In fact, most franchisors seem to 
readily acknowledge that franchisees need lawyers.29 
B. How the Article Proceeds 
Part II of this Article explores the franchisee’s decision about whether 
to hire an attorney for representation throughout the franchise bargaining 
process. First, this Article analyzes why some franchisees never consult 
an attorney before proceeding to the bargaining process.  It also considers
the consequences of such an omission both at law and on the parties’ 
franchise agreement.  A survey conducted for this Article demonstrates 
that many franchisees who need representation simply go without it or 
otherwise remain without effective counsel. In addition, this Article
considers the psychological reasons behind why franchisees fail to 
consult a lawyer before proceeding to the bargaining process.30  The role
of, and need for, the franchisee to utilize an attorney during the bargaining 
process is therefore explored.31 
28. As one would expect, the terms of these contracts tend to favor the franchisor.
See generally Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Interpretation: A Two-Standard 
Approach, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 641 (examining the current inadequate legal standards 
employed for the franchising relationship and proposing a new approach to franchise 
contract interpretation). 
29. Indeed, franchisors often tell franchisees that they should hire lawyers.  See 
Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses, supra note 2, at 959  (noting that many franchise 
agreements contain clauses that purport the franchisee was advised to obtain legal 
counsel). Although the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) mandates certain disclosures 
to prospective franchisees, it has no such required statement from the franchisor about 
the would-be franchisee’s need to hire counsel.  See infra Part V (discussing, inter alia, 
the FTC disclosure regime). 
30. Many franchisees believe they do not need to consult an attorney before they 
decide to invest.  Others believe they are capable of self-representation. See infra Part 
II.C. The irony of the prospective franchisee’s decision making is that the least 
confident persons may be the most capable, while the most confident persons do not
know much and are least likely to know they are uninformed.  See infra Part II.C.
31. See infra Part II.D. Indeed, in Part VI.B, infra, this Author proposes an
explicit warning to potential franchisees that they need representation and, for their own 
sake, to obtain the assistance of counsel before, as is likely to be the case, proceeding 
beyond their pro se capabilities.  Besides bluntly telling prospective franchisees to hire a 



















   
 
Part III examines whether franchisees are truly unsophisticated parties 
who require additional protections.  Some courts have held that when the
franchisee has no business experience and reasonably relies on the 
franchisor’s representations, the franchise agreement may be held as
void if the franchisor intended to take advantage of the franchisee’s
inexperience. Conversely, some courts have held that franchisees are 
sophisticated investors who knowingly enter into a franchise agreement 
and, therefore, should be bound by the agreement. 
Part IV studies the franchisor-franchisee relationship as it is governed 
under contract law, including the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
as well as the concept of unconscionability.  Whether the franchisor 
obtains a windfall when negotiating with unrepresented franchisees is
examined.  Additionally, this Part considers whether (1) franchise 
agreements are adhesion contracts, which solely benefit the franchisor;
and (2) an attorney owes a duty to the unrepresented franchisee to ensure 
that procedural rights are not unknowingly contracted away through 
unconscionable contracts or provisions. 
Part V focuses on how the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and state
disclosure laws have handled the issues raised in this Article.  In Part VI,
the Author proposes two disclosure-based solutions to the problems 
associated with unrepresented franchisees bargaining for franchises.  In 
support of these solutions, the Author evaluates the strong policy arguments
behind enacting better disclosure laws. 
II. FRANCHISEES AND THE DECISION WHETHER TO 
HIRE AN ATTORNEY
The franchisee-franchisor relationship has often been referred to as a 
“David and Goliath” relationship in light of the unequal bargaining 
power between the parties.32  Courts have generally been concerned
about the capability of the franchisor and the franchisor’s attorney to 
overpower the franchisee’s ability to bargain effectively.33  For purposes 
of this Article, that concern is only relevant when the franchisee is—as
seems to be increasingly common—not represented by counsel.  There 
experienced they may otherwise be, they are probably quite unskilled and unaware
concerning a particular franchise, the legal documents related to that franchise, and the
law of franchising. 
32. See Newark Motor Inn Corp. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 1143, 1152 
(D.N.J. 1979). 
33. See Rochelle B. Spandorf & Beata Krakus, Observations on Negotiating
Franchise Agreements in Today’s Legal Environment, LJN’S FRANCHISING BUS. & L.
ALERT, Jan. 2007, at 1, 1 (noting that franchisors often “resist prospective franchisee 
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are numerous rationales why a franchisee may not seek counsel when
negotiating the franchise agreement, including such factors as time, cost, 
complexity, and the franchisee simply not feeling it is necessary.  However, 
the franchisee’s choice not to retain an attorney when bargaining may
have implications on the process.  Often, the franchisee may not obtain 
the most beneficial deal possible without representation, and in extreme 
cases, the agreement will be held void if the court finds that the franchisor 
or his attorney took advantage of the unrepresented franchisee.34  Because 
neither situation is cost effective—at least in the broader social context35 
—it is important to consider various reasons why the franchisee may
decide not to hire an attorney.36 
A. Franchisees Often Fail To Hire an Attorney 
Franchisors often resist negotiating with potential franchisees over the
terms of the franchise.37  If a would-be franchisee’s attempt to negotiate
is, or at least is thought to be, futile, then a logical consequence is the 
potential franchisee’s reluctance to hire someone to dispense “pointless
advice.”38  Many sources show that it is common for a franchisee to 
34. Perhaps it could be held to be so one-sided, with the franchisor having such an
advantage, that it has little of the classic arm’s length transaction expected to be present 
in a business deal. See infra note 148 and accompanying text, discussing Schott
Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 976 F.2d 58, 65 (1st Cir. 1992), for
the proposition that a franchise arrangement may not, given the facts, constitute an arm’s 
length transaction.
35. Commentators have pointed out that when a franchisor gets too much of the 
franchise “deal” at the expense of franchisees, it can be bad for consumers and for the 
franchising method of conducting business.  See Uri Benoliel, Criticizing the Economic
Analysis of Franchise Encroachment Law, 75 ALB. L. REV. 205, 224–25 (2012)
(discussing franchisor encroachment causing franchisee failure and also increased social 
costs such as higher consumer prices and externalized costs passed on to other 
franchisors).
36. See infra Parts II.A and II.C. 
37. Spandorf & Krakus, supra note 33, at 1 (“While no empirical data exist on the 
percentage of franchisors that will negotiate the terms of their franchise contract with 
prospective franchisees, it is fair to conclude that they remain a minority.”).  Spandorf
and Krakus note that “[s]ome franchisors have no incentive to negotiate” because they
have a plentiful number of prospects or a desire to avoid administrative burdens or 
fallout that may arise from negotiating the terms of each franchise contract separately.
Id. 
38. Andrew C. Selden & Rupert M. Barkoff, Counseling Franchisees, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF FRANCHISING 289, 291 (Rupert M. Barkoff & Andrew C. Selden
eds., 3d ed. 2008) (noting that a lawyer may be seen as someone asked to do simply one 
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enter into a franchise agreement without representation.39  An e-mail and
telephone survey conducted from September to November 2011 and 
again from March to May 2014 of franchise lawyers who represent more 
than half of all franchised businesses in the United States revealed that 
many franchisees do not commonly use counsel at negotiations.40  In  
fact, when franchisor attorneys were surveyed, it became apparent that at
closings the attorneys had attended within the past two years, counsel 
represented only 26.07% of the franchisees.41  Interestingly, the franchisees
most likely to obtain legal representation were those with mid-level
investments,42 those negotiating with franchisors that had been in
business for ten or more years before becoming franchisors,43 and those
thing: “bless” a franchise agreement that the franchisor already has proclaimed
“nonnegotiable”).
39. Id.; see also Byron E. Fox & Henry C. Su, Franchise Regulation—Solutions 
in Search of Problems?, 20 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 241, 283 n.155 (1995) (discussing the 
reluctance of franchisees to seek counsel while negotiating a franchise agreement and the 
rampant belief among franchisees that obtaining an attorney is too cumbersome for the 
process of negotiations); Nathan E. Ross, Federalism Versus the Greater Good . . . 
Should Powerful Franchisors Be Allowed To Contract for the Home Court Advantage 
Through Forum Selection Clauses?, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 199, 211–12 (citing
Zimmerman, infra, at 760–61) (arguing that “[t]he franchisor is usually a much larger
company, represented by attorneys at the time the agreement is signed; whereas, the
franchisee is often a single person unrepresented by legal counsel”); James Zimmerman, 
Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise Agreements and the Federal 
Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted?, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 761 (1998) (discussing
the inequalities of the franchise negotiation process when it concerns forum selection 
clauses).
40. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 2.  The names, addresses, 
and other vital information for conducting the survey were obtained from FRANdata, a 
database hosted by Franchise Information Services, Inc., an Arlington, Virginia, based 
company specializing in gathering and reporting data related to franchising.  This 
Author, with the assistance of student assistants, used the FRANdata information to
determine e-mail addresses and contact the surveyed lawyers both by e-mail and by
telephone.  The attorneys contacted averaged fifteen to sixteen years of practice experience
(fifteen years median; sixteen years mean).  Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, 
Question 10. 
41. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 2. 
42. Franchisees with an average investment between $150,000 and $350,000 were
represented by counsel in 30.5% of closings, while franchisees with over $1.2 million in 
investments were represented in 26.6% of closings and franchisees with less than
$70,000 in investments were represented by counsel in only 16.8% of closings.  This
Author generated the data from the answers to Franchise Lawyer Survey and the data
furnished by FRANdata.  See supra note 40; infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, 
Question 2.
43. This Author generated the data from answers to the Franchise Lawyer Survey 
and the data furnished by FRANdata.  Based on this information, this Author calculated 
that (1) franchisees entering into a franchise arrangement with franchisors that had been
in business for ten or more years before becoming a franchisor were represented by
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dealing with franchisors having fewer than 500 units in the franchise 
system.44  In response to this Author’s survey, the franchisor attorneys
offered the following comments: 
 “It is unusual for any of [our] franchisees to actually have 
attorneys and/or accountants represent them in the purchase 
process.”45 
 “The franchisees are very rarely represented by counsel.”46 
 “[For] existing franchised businesses . . . franchisees are 
underrepresented and their counsel often ignore the franchise 
and focus on the assets.  I am often amazed at how resolution 
of the franchise transaction is an afterthought.”47 
Even if the franchisee seeks legal counsel, it may not actually help
much.  Surveyed franchisor attorneys also stated: 
 “[On the rare occasion when franchisees hire lawyers,] they 
are typically represented by a generalist attorney.”48 
 “Franchisees who have consulted with counsel generally retain a 
general practitioner [usually their family attorney] who is not 
familiar with franchising.”49 
 “Franchisees go to the family lawyer or [their] friend[s] for 
counsel.  Franchising law is a specialty, and general practitioners 
usually aren’t familiar with the laws and [regulations].”50 
experience in the business before franchising that business were represented by counsel 
in only 6.1% of closings; and (3) franchisees contracting with franchisors that had
between one and five years of business before starting to franchise were represented by
counsel in 19.6% of closings. See supra note 40 (discussing FRANdata); infra Appendix, 
Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 2.
44. Franchisees dealing with franchisors having fewer than 500 units in the 
franchise system were represented by counsel in 42.7% of closings, while franchisees 
entering into a contract with franchisors that have 500 or more units in the franchise 
system were represented by counsel in only 8.0% of closings. See supra note 40; infra 
Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 2.































   










    
B. Evidence from a Survey of Franchising Counsel: The 
Uncounseled Franchisee
This Author’s survey of franchising lawyers supports what observers 
of franchising have long concluded: Regardless of the unequal bargaining 
power, lack of knowledge about the franchisor’s business, or lack of
knowledge of the process for obtaining a franchise, many franchisees 
still decide to “go it alone.”51  In other words, despite the many reasons
why a franchisee should obtain counsel, such as boiling down contract
legalese or simply advocating for a better deal, franchisees are still
reluctant to obtain an attorney, particularly one experienced in franchise
law. Franchise lawyers who responded to the survey reported that out of
the 1607 franchise closings they had attended,52 only 419 of the closings
involved franchisees who were represented by counsel.53  Moreover,
while the business sophistication of franchisees has generally increased
over the past ten years,54 51.1% of surveyed franchisor attorneys believed
that the percentage of franchisees represented by lawyers in franchise
closings remained the same, that is, neither increased nor decreased over
the past decade.55  A franchisee’s decision to enter negotiations without 
counsel is largely based on the “prevailing public perception [] that
franchise agreements are non-negotiable”56 and the fact that franchisees
51. Id.  However, for the Author’s survey of franchisor lawyers, some franchisors
commented that franchisees have “increased in sophistication,” and come to the 
negotiations with “more money and a higher level of business experience.” Id.
52. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 1. 
53. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 2. 
54. See Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 13 (noting that over
half of the franchise lawyers interviewed opined that franchisee business sophistication
has risen, and nearly one-quarter concluded it has remained about the same, with no one 
claiming it had fallen). 
55. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 11.  Such “closings”
were defined, for purposes of the survey, as “process[es] in which the franchisor and 
franchisee, perhaps at a meeting (but not necessarily in such a face-to-face conference),
sign the franchise agreement and perhaps related documents.” Infra Appendix, Franchise 
Lawyer Survey, Question 1. Note that this majority of the responding franchisor lawyers, as
a class of respondents, in turn dealt with a large preponderance of the overall franchised
business units in American franchising.  Note further that the remainder of the respondents,
24.1%, believed that the percentage of franchisees represented at closings had increased
in the past decade, and none thought the percentage had diminished. Infra Appendix, 
Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 11. 
56. Spandorf & Krakus, supra note 33, at 1.  Despite this public perception,
“some degree of negotiation is not uncommon particularly in franchise systems requiring 
larger initial investments that tend to attract more sophisticated buyers.” Id. at 2. 
Additionally, the Federal Trade Commission “believes that franchise sellers and
prospective franchisees should be free to negotiate the terms of the franchise agreement.”  
Id. (quoting FTC, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING 
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“believe, or are told, that a lawyer will be costly and will only slow down 
the process or kill the deal.”57 
When franchisees do have legal representation during the negotiation 
and closing process, some franchisors comment that it is unhelpful.58 
Although franchisee attorneys have become generally more sophisticated 
about franchise law,59 franchisor lawyers contested the competence of 
franchisee lawyers, who “were not franchise attorneys but general practice 
attorneys, who tended to ask for changes that franchisors would never 
agree to (e.g., deletion of covenants against competition, change in royalty 
fees).”60  The ineffectiveness of legal representation may be further 
aggravated by a lack of relationship between the lawyer and the franchisee, 
with some franchisees obtaining counsel less than six months before the 
closing.61  Therefore, employing unsophisticated and unfamiliar counsel
may result in a lack of protection for the franchisee.  Additionally, survey
results reveal that the effectiveness of legal counsel at a closing often 
hinges on the franchisee’s and franchisor’s characteristics.62  In fact, only 
12% of counsel for those franchisees with investments between $150,000 
REVISED TRADE REGULATION RULE (16 CFR PART 436), at 261 (2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/staff-report-bureau-consumer-protection
-federal-trade-commission-and-proposed-revised-trade/0408franchiserulerpt.pdf). 
57. Selden & Barkoff, supra note 38, at 291. 
58. See Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 6 (noting that only
9.79% of franchisees had a lawyer whose quality of representation was deemed excellent,
while most franchisee counsel were considered good or very good and almost a quarter of
franchisee lawyers were found to be, at best, only fair); supra text accompanying notes 
45–50 (discussing comments of franchisor attorneys disparaging the capabilities of the
franchisee’s lawyer). 
59. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, question 12.  On the other hand, 
some franchise lawyers commented that the franchisees’ lawyers “all [had] no understanding
of the dynamics of franchising.”  One lawyer, while praising the sophistication of most
of its franchisees—with hotel franchises having an ultimate construction cost of between 
$20 million and $100 million per location—wrote about how these franchisees tended to
hire counsel who knew much about real estate or finance but very little about franchising. 
60. Comments from Franchisors, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 15 (on file 
with author).  Indeed, some franchisor lawyers opine that the franchisee attorney, if there
is one, has very little, if any, experience in representing franchisees.  Infra Appendix,
Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 8.
61. See infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 7 (noting that only
21.04% of franchisor attorneys worked with franchisees who had a lawyer that had been
their counsel for more than six months prior to the closing; however, most simply did not
know the degree of prior contact between franchisees and their lawyer). 
62. See infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Questions 7, 9. 
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and $350,000 sought to obtain more favorable terms for their clients.63 
On the other hand, other categories of franchisees fared much better: 
73.99% of franchisee lawyers sought more favorable terms for the
franchisee when the franchisor had been in business for ten or more years
before it started to franchise,64 and 75.2% of franchisee lawyers sought
to negotiate more favorable terms for their clients when dealing with
franchise networks with under 500 units.65  Perhaps prospective franchisees
are warier of businesses that wait a long time—ten years or more—to 
decide whether to franchise the business, or that have yet to reach critical 
mass in terms of the number of units.  At any rate, it is fair to say that even 
when franchisees are represented by counsel at closing, not all franchisees
are represented equally.
Some franchisors remark that it is often the case that franchisees are 
protected by franchise associations.66  This type of association “may be
an independent organization recognized as such by the franchisor company 
or an advisory board, the membership of which is either selected or
approved by the franchisor company.”67 Generally, the purpose of these 
associations is to “negotiate the standard form of franchise agreements
on behalf of its membership, and those franchise associations generally
are represented by expert counsel.”68  Consequently, franchisees that are 
part of a franchise association may not need independent counsel for each 
63. The Author generated the data from the answers to Franchise Lawyer Survey 
and the data furnished by FRANdata.  86% of counsel for franchisees with investments 
over $1.2 million sought more favorable terms for their clients; 80% of franchisee 
lawyers sought to negotiate favorable terms for franchisees with investments under 
$70,000; and the enormous difference between these high figures and those of the mid-
level investments—between $150,000 and $350,000—may be attributed to a relatively
small sample size within that subcategory.  See supra note 40; infra Appendix, Franchise
Lawyer Survey, Question 2. 
64. The Author generated the data from the answers to Franchise Lawyer Survey 
and the data furnished by FRANdata.  62.5% of franchisee lawyers sought more 
favorable terms for clients dealing with franchisors with no prior time in business before 
becoming a franchisor; 45.5% of franchisee attorneys sought to negotiate better terms for
franchisees dealing with franchisors having between one and five years of business prior 
to becoming a franchisor.  See supra note 40; infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, 
Question 3.
65. Again, the author generated the data from the answers to Franchise Lawyer 
Survey and the data furnished by FRANdata. Only 64.8% of franchisees’ lawyers 
attempted to negotiate better terms for franchisees dealing with franchisors that have 500 
or more units in the franchise. See supra note 40; infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer 
Survey, Question 2. 
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individual franchise negotiation because they have the benefit of the 
standard form agreement.69 
Others argue that because the franchise applicant is frequently unfamiliar 
with franchising, many franchisees wrongfully believe that the norm is
not to consult an attorney before investing.70  Moreover, if the franchisee 
is told by the franchisor that there is no need to consult an attorney
before continuing with the transaction, the franchisee likely will not seek
legal advice before entering into the franchise relationship.71  If the
franchisee believes that an attorney will only cost it more money and 
time and that it can successfully negotiate the agreement itself, the 
franchisee is less likely to obtain counsel.72 
Unfortunately for the franchisee, “[f]ranchise agreements are lengthy, 
complex, and subtle.”73  An attorney can advise the franchisee in numerous
areas and can also be a strong advocate.74  In fact, according to this 
Author’s survey, only 24.82% of franchisee attorneys merely advised the 
franchisee without also engaging in the franchise negotiations.75  By not
hiring an attorney, the franchisee is implicitly asserting that it is either
qualified to perform the requisite duties in all of these areas or unaware
69. Id. According to the results of this Author’s survey, perhaps about only a 
third of franchisees-to-be are the beneficiaries of a standard form contract negotiated by
the franchisor and a franchisee association.  Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, 
Question 14 (finding such a standard, negotiated contract form for 37.69% of franchised 
units for which there was a survey response).  For more on franchisee associations as a
mechanism for individual franchisee relief as well as a tool for system-wide reform, see
Robert W. Emerson & Uri Benoliel, Can Franchisee Associations Serve as a Substitute 
for Franchisee Protection Laws, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 99 (2013). 
70. See Selden & Barkoff, supra note 38, at 291. 
71. See id. 
72. Practicing franchise lawyers agree. In an interview, franchisor lawyer Robert 
T. Joseph asked, “How much does it cost a franchisee to get representation?  Let’s say it
is $400 an hour. Is someone really going to pay $3,000 for eight hours of negotiation?
Probably not. They should, but they don’t.”  Telephone Interview by Jason Parnell, 
Assistant to this Author, with Robert T. Joseph, franchisor lawyer and Partner, SNR
Denton (June 4, 2012). 
73. Selden & Barkoff, supra note 38, at 277. 
74. The lawyer is counsel to the franchisee in (1) deciding whether to purchase a
franchise; (2) selecting and investigating the franchise; (3) reviewing disclosure and 
registration documents; (4) negotiating franchise agreements; (5) site selection and 
preparation; (6) forming agreements with other parties; (7) the legal review of the 
franchisee’s operations; (8) monitoring the franchisor’s performance; and (9) termination 
and nonrenewal.  GARNER, supra note 13, at §§ 2:11–:19 (2013). 




















    
 
  




   
 
of all the areas that will need to be considered in contracting for the
franchise.76 
The franchisee that believes legal assistance is not required will likely 
realize later that an attorney is needed, as the agreement becomes
increasingly complicated.  Further, the franchisee may learn that
representation is needed in the event that a dispute arises between the 
franchisor and franchisee during the negotiations or after the fact.  Such
a dispute calls for either diplomatic skills to settle the matter, representation 
in court to reach a resolution, or representation in arbitration when the
settlement fails. However, by the time the franchisee comes to this 
realization, a significant amount of its investment may have already been
lost. 
C. The Psychological Basis for the Franchisee’s Self-Representation 
The findings from the Author’s survey of lawyers who have participated 
in franchise closings run in tandem with basic psychology.  While many
franchisees choose not to hire a lawyer before investing in a franchise 
because they believe it will cost them time or money, there are other
psychological reasons why franchisees may opt to represent themselves
in a transaction.  Interestingly, franchisees that are the least capable of 
self-representation are often the ones who insist upon representing 
themselves.77 This subpart evaluates the psychological basis for self-
representation and considers whether those franchisees that decide to 
represent themselves need additional protections to guard against
their own inexperience. 
First, some franchisees decide not to hire an attorney because they
believe they do not need assistance. David Dunning, a Professor of
Psychology at Cornell University, proposes that “[o]n average, people 
tend to hold overly favorable views of themselves.  They overestimate
their skill, their knowledge, their moral character, and their place on the
social ladder.”78  For example, when asked “if their skill level is ‘average,’ 
76. In the latter situation, the franchisee-to-be obviously cannot make an educated
determination as to her appropriate course of action. 
77. See DAVID DUNNING, SELF-INSIGHT: ROADBLOCKS AND DETOURS ON THE PATH 
TO KNOWING THYSELF 4 (2005) (“[A]s a general rule, people’s impressions of their
abilities—whether arrogant or humble—are not anchored very closely to their actual
level of skill . . . . [W]hat people think about themselves can be quite distinct from the
truth of their competence and expertise.”).
78. Id. at 6; see also John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social 
Comparative Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and 
Comparative-Optimism Effects, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 813, 813 (2004) (stating that 
“people have a pervasive tendency to believe they are better than others in a multitude of
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‘above average,’ or ‘below average,’ too many people endorse the above 
average option . . . a belief that cannot be objectively possible.”79 
Dunning also proposes that people’s overconfidence is at its peak 
when they are “sure of what they are saying.”80  Yet, even “[w]hen people
express 100% certainty in their predictions, they still tend to be wrong 
roughly one time out of every five, an error rate of 20%.”81  Thus, the surer 
the franchisee is that it can negotiate on its own, the more likely it is that
the franchisee will be mistaken. 
Similarly, overconfidence can lead to overoptimism about outcomes in 
various legal situations. Professor Sean Hannon Williams has reported 
that an overly rosy view about everything—marriage, employment 
contracts, credit card use—can lead to an underestimation of potential 
negative effects and a belief that the law will protect people regardless of
their position.82  Furthermore, the overly optimistic person tends to form
a bias in favor of one viewpoint and fails to seriously consider contrary
information.83  In practice, a franchisee may be so optimistic about a
new business venture that the franchisee becomes biased in thinking that 
addition, in overestimating their abilities, people may not realize they would have been 
better off had they been represented by counsel. See, e.g., CARL E. SCHNEIDER & 
MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND 
PERSPECTIVES 329 (3d ed. 2006) (discussing how “30% of wives were awarded alimony
when both parties were represented by counsel, while not one alimony award was made
when neither party was represented by counsel”). 
79. DUNNING, supra note 77, at 6. People’s average rating of themselves as well 
above average is sometimes termed “illusory superiority.”  See Vera Hoorens, Self-
Enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison, in 4 EUR. REVIEW OF SOC. 
PSYCHOLOGY 117 (Wolfgang Stroebe & Miles Hewstone eds., 1993).  This has been a 
theme in popular culture and has even been labeled the “Lake Wobegon Effect” after
humorist Garrison Keillor’s fictitious town “where all the women are strong, all the men 
are good-looking, and all the children are above average.”  Garrison Keillor, Monologue, 
A Prairie Home Companion, Massachusetts Public Radio (Mar. 4, 1995). 
80. DUNNING, supra note 77, at 7. 
81. Id.  However, Dunning does articulate instances when a person is not likely to
be overly confident, such as when “the task at hand is particularly easy and performance 
is high, people tend to be underconfident in their performance.” DUNNING, supra note
77, at 9.
82. See Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-
Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 733, 734–35 (2009). 
83. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is
Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993) (discussing how married couples will typically


















   
 
 
   
 
 






the franchise agreement is sound and that nothing in the future could go 
wrong.
Additionally, many inexperienced franchisees that choose to represent 
themselves believe that they possess the skills to negotiate the contract 
on their own. Thus, many inexperienced franchisees are unaware that
they need professional representation during the transaction.  In the case
of many franchisees, “not only do [they] reach erroneous conclusions
and make unfortunate choices, but their incompetence robs them of
the . . . ability to realize it.”84  They do not actively decide against seeking 
help, but passively fail to even consider pursuing legal or other assistance. 
A research experiment conducted by Justin Kruger and David Dunning at
Cornell University revealed that “people who lack the knowledge or 
wisdom to perform well are often unaware of this fact.”85  This lack of
wisdom results in a double-edged sword: “[T]he same incompetence that 
leads them to make wrong choices also deprives them of the savvy 
necessary to recognize competence, be it their own or anyone else’s.”86 
Thus, these franchisees suffer a double burden.87  First, these franchisees
lack the knowledge that would enable them to represent themselves in
the transaction.  Secondly, their lack of knowledge plagues the franchisees 
by giving them a false sense of competence and blinding them to the fact 
that they are in no position to represent themselves.88  These franchisees
who represent themselves not only believe they are capable of 
effectively doing so, but also tend to believe that their performance is
“above average.”89 
84. Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How 
Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 
77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121, 1121 (1999); see also DUNNING, supra note 
77, at 15 (suggesting that it is not that people who are performing poorly “fail to 
recognize their incompetence,” but rather, “people performing poorly cannot be expected
to recognize their ineptitude.  They are simply not in a position to know that they are 
doing badly.  The ability to recognize the depth of their inadequacies is beyond them”). 
85. Kruger & Dunning, supra note 84, at 1126. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1121. 
88. See id. at 1130 (noting that “incompetence . . . not only causes poor performance 
but also the inability to recognize that one’s performance is poor”). 
89. See id. at 1122; see also id. at 1125, Figure 2 (depicting that those who scored 
in the lowest percentile in perceived logical reasoning ability and test performances 
believed they scored above average).  There is no reason to believe franchisees are
substantially different than employees who, on average, “think that they’re well above 
average [relative to] everybody else” with regard to their more expertise, leadership,
sophistication, and even idealism.  Alix Spiegel, American’s Flunk Self-Assessment, 
NPR (Oct. 6, 2007, 4:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 
15073430 (transcribing NPR’s All Things Considered radio broadcast).  Dunning notes 
that the phenomenon of a populace that tends to overestimate its relative abilities is 
726
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D. The Role of the Counselor 
There are essentially four stages for potential counseling in the
franchising process.90  The first stage is the purchase of the franchise.91 
It is important for the franchisee to have representation at this stage
because “the franchisee needs a professional advisor who is familiar
with investments in business but who also has some knowledge of the 
idiosyncrasies of franchising.”92  Legal advice at the time of purchase is
also important; an attorney who commonly engages in franchise
negotiations may be in a better position to determine whether it is a 
quality investment and can prevent an unwary franchisee from making 
an unwise business decision.93 
The second stage of counseling is ownership.94  At this point,
representation is important because “business-related counseling is 
restricted to North America and Europe; in Japan or China, people are more likely to say
that they are “average” or “slightly below average.” Id.
There may be other psychological reasons why a franchisee believes that he is capable 
of self-representation.  For example, Dunning also notes that it is possible that those who
are incompetent are relatively aware of this fact at some level. DUNNING, supra note 77, 
at 28. Yet, these people are incompetent because “to admit to poor performance either to 
themselves or other people is an action that they are motivated to avoid.”  Id. Thus, 
Dunning proposes that some of those who are “incompetent are actively engaged in 
denial. They just refuse to recognize their errors; they deliberately short-circuit any
awareness they may have of their mistakes.” Id.  Therefore, some franchisees may be 
cognitively aware that they are not adequately capable of representing themselves in the 
transaction.  Yet, rather than admitting this fact, they engage in “denial” and convince 
themselves that they are capable of self-representation. See id. at 29. 
90. Selden & Barkoff, supra note 38, at 289. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 289–90.  Although desirable, the doubly qualified advisor—knowledgeable
about both business generally and franchising in particular—may be a rarity.  Usually,
prospective franchisees have attorneys that are not capable of representing them. 
Telephone Interview by Jason Parnell, Assistant to the Author, with Lee J. Plave, 
franchisor lawyer and Partner, Plave Koch PLC (May 17, 2012).  For example, in some
cases, a personal injury lawyer will go beyond his typical area of practice and, for a 
current or past personal injury client who is a prospective franchisee, engage in franchise 
agreement negotiations.  Id.  In these circumstances, competence is a substantial issue.
Id. Accordingly, even if a franchisee has an attorney, there is no guarantee that the
lawyer chosen by the franchisee will be competent or effective. Id.
93. See Warren Pengilley, International Franchising Arrangements and Problems 
in Their Negotiation, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 185, 193–94 (1985) (describing how lawyer
involvement in franchise negotiation is “desirable at an early stage”). 































   
   
   
  
 
often required.”95  An attorney’s negotiating skills are essential at this
stage because he can effectively protect the “franchisee’s legal rights” or 
“business interests” in the event of a franchisor-franchisee dispute.96 
In the third stage, the attorney may be required to take a more diplomatic 
stance to mitigate any conflict between the franchisor and franchisee.97 
The franchisees’ attorneys “must be familiar with the business 
arrangements” and “understand what the bargaining positions of the 
franchisees may be.”98  The goal of the attorney at this point is to ensure
that the franchisor cooperates in the negotiations while still satisfying the
demands of his client, the franchisee.  The franchisee’s attorney may
“play a role in negotiating a collective agreement with the franchisor” to
ensure that his client’s interests are fulfilled.99 
The last stage begins when disputes arise and “diplomacy has failed.”100 
Here, the attorney assumes a more traditional role as an advocate for his 
client, potentially at trial. The attorney should also be proficient in
alternative dispute resolution because, alternatively, he may be required 
to settle the issue in front of an arbitration or dispute resolution panel 
rather than by trial.101 
Thus, there are various roles the attorney is required to assume when
representing a franchisee.  These roles require that the attorney is equipped 
with knowledge of how the franchising process works.  Many franchisees 
are not sophisticated in their business experiences and therefore could 
easily be taken advantage of by the franchisor or his attorney in the 
negotiating process.102  Nevertheless, many franchisees choose not to
retain counsel before investing, regardless of the possible ramifications.
Only later is a hard lesson learned. 
Many franchisees learn after the fact that starting a franchise is an
extremely complicated process and that there are steps that could be
taken to make the process run smoother.  According to a Wells Fargo/ 
Gallup Small Business Index poll, many small business owners reported





99. Id.  Even at this stage, however, a lawyer still must recognize “the needs of
the commercial community.”  Pengilley, supra note 93, at 193.  Too often lawyers think 
they can or should run the direction of the negotiations.  Id. at 194.  This, however, is not 
always a commercial reality and can actually stifle the progress of the proposed business 
deal.  See id. A lawyer’s role, therefore, at least in this context, should be that of an
advisor rather than an adversary. See id.
100.  Selden & Barkoff, supra note 38, at 290. 
101. Id.
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startup process again.103  For example, many reported that they would
have had more capital backing, asked for more advice from experienced
business owners, or obtained a better understanding of financial
management rights before getting started.104  Additionally, one in three of
those surveyed reported that obtaining more legal advice would have 
been helpful.105  This Author’s survey revealed that 27.92% of
franchisee attorneys had a high level of prior experience in their clients’
respective franchise industries, although only 8.11% had no experience 
at all.106  Thus, legal advice can be especially beneficial to franchisees 
that lack business expertise and experience.107  Yet, it is still important
for those who do have business familiarity to obtain legal advice.
Although “experience and knowing the competition is extremely helpful 
in any business,” the attorney’s role encompasses much more than merely 
detailing the particular business.108  It also requires strong negotiation
and advocacy skills, which a lawyer is more likely to possess than a
franchisee.
III. FRANCHISEE: SOPHISTICATED BUSINESSPERSON OR 
INEXPERIENCED INVESTOR? 
As established above, some courts may be more sympathetic to 
inexperienced franchisees that negotiate with more sophisticated franchisors
represented by counsel.109  However, a franchisee will not be able to rely 
103. See Dennis Jacobe, Lessons Learned About Starting a Small Business: Small
Business Owners Share What Would Have Made Starting Their Businesses Easier, GALLUP
(Sept. 18, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/24574/Lessons-Learned-About-Starting-Small-
Business.aspx.
Results for the Wells Fargo/Gallup Small Business Index poll are based on
telephone interviews with 602 small business owners conducted May 22–June 
9, 2006.  For results based on the total sample of investors, one can say with 95%
confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error is ±4 percentage points. 
Id.
 104. See id.
105. This factor ranked fourth among those polled regarding things that would have 
helped in starting a business. See id.
 106. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 9. 
107. One in five small business owners surveyed reported that they had no business
experience before starting their businesses.  Jacobe, supra note 103. 
108. Id.
 109. See, e.g., Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1282–83 (9th Cir. 
2006) (discussing how “[f]ranchising involves the unequal bargaining power of 
























    
     
 
on judicially favorable predispositions if that franchisee is deemed “a
sophisticated investor.”110  The next two subparts discuss the distinctions
between the two types of franchisees and the additional protections courts
are willing or unwilling to grant them.
A. The Sophisticated Businessperson
In North American Financial Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R. Enterprises, Inc., 
the plaintiff, prospective franchisee North American Financial Group, 
was “in the business of raising venture capital and investing or loaning 
venture capital,” and defendant S.M.R. Enterprises franchised hair care
centers operating under the mark “Fantastic Sam’s.”111  The parties had 
negotiated on and off, in three distinct time periods, for three supposed 
deals made or formed anew.112  The last deal was for the sale of a
franchise area, but when Fantastic Sam’s refused to tender the franchise
pursuant to the alleged agreement, North American Financial Group 
filed suit and claimed that Fantastic Sam’s had violated the Securities 
Act of 1933,113 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO),114 and the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act,115 as well as
committed common law fraud.116  The court noted that under Illinois
law common law fraud is defined as “anything calculated to deceive, 
whether positive acts, omissions or concealments, where a legal or equitable 
(quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 374 (1996))).  However,
some franchisor lawyers will not negotiate with a prospective franchisee unless that 
person has a lawyer present or on call.  E-mail Interview by Jason Parnell, Assistant to
the Author, with Tom Pitegoff, franchisor lawyer, Pitegoff Law Office PLLC (Apr. 24, 
2012). Similarly, some franchisor lawyers, just by the very nature of how the franchisor 
does business, will rarely interface with franchisees, with the exception of international
development deals that have a great amount of money at stake.  Telephone Interview by
Jason Parnell, Assistant to the Author, with Rochelle Spandorf, franchisor lawyer and 
Partner, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP (June 14, 2012). 
110. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D Private Franchise Contracts § 260 (2013) (discussing 
that a franchisee may not be able to claim reasonable reliance when the franchisee is a 
sophisticated investor). 
111.  583 F. Supp. 691, 693 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
112. Id. at 693–95. 
113. Id. at 695. The alleged violation was Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982). 
114. Id. at 697. North American Financial Group based its RICO allegations on 
claims of two predicate offenses: mail fraud and wire fraud arising under 18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1343, 1961(1)(B) (1982). 
115. Id. at 699–700 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. 1991, ch. 121 1/2, para. 701–40 (current 
version at 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/1–/44 (2013)).
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duty is breached causing damage to the plaintiff.”117  Thus, for North 
American Financial Group to prevail on a claim of common law fraud it 
had to establish 
(1) that the defendants made a false representation of a material past or existing
fact; (2) which was known to be false when made; (3) the misrepresentation
must have been made intentionally to induce the plaintiff to act; (4) the plaintiff
must rely on the misrepresentation and have the right to rely; and (5) the 
plaintiff must be injured as a result of such reliance.118 
In considering these elements, the North American Financial Group
court noted that the “background, special expertise or education” of the 
claimant should be examined to determine whether reliance on the alleged 
misrepresentation was reasonable.119 
Here, the court held that North American Financial Group had no
claim in law against Fantastic Sam’s for common law fraud.120  First, the
court noted that the alleged misrepresentations121 cited by North 
American Financial Group were “likely discoverable” by the franchisee 
before it entered into its franchise agreement with Fantastic Sam’s.122 
Further, the court found that it “certainly is reasonable to assume that an
entity planning to commit as much as one half million dollars in an
unknown enterprise would check out the president of that enterprise,” 
and that North American Financial Group’s failure to do so was
unreasonable.123  It appears that the court deemed North American 
Financial Group a sophisticated investor, most likely because it was in
the business of raising, investing, or lending venture capital. 
Similarly, in Payne v. McDonald’s Corp.,124 plaintiff Osborne Allen
Payne, a long-time, multiple-franchise-owning McDonald’s franchisee 
117. Id. at 697 (citing Majewski v. Gallina, 160 N.E.2d 783, 788 (Ill. 1959); Casey
Electric Contracting, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Elgin, 392 N.E.2d 759, 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979)).
118. Id.
 119. Id. at 698. 
120. See id.
121. North American Financial Group alleged that Fantastic Sam’s president and
director “misrepresented his past business ventures and successes expressly to induce 
North American into investing in Fantastic.”  Id. at 693. The court, however, held that 
North American failed to show that these were material misrepresentations or omissions.
See id. at 698. 
122. See id.
 123. Id.














   












in Baltimore, claimed, among other things,125 that he reasonably relied
on McDonald’s misrepresentations and thereby suffered decreased
revenues, loss of profitability, and inability to sell his restaurants.126 
McDonald’s allegedly had misrepresented (1) the franchisee’s cost to 
rebuild one of the franchisee’s four restaurants—the Broadway location, 
(2) the rebuilt Broadway location’s projected profits, and (3) the impact 
that opening two nearby McDonald’s restaurants would have on sales at
the Broadway restaurant.127  Payne asserted that, in light of the fact that
the franchisor possessed “exclusive or superior knowledge and should 
have been aware that the other party would rely heavily on its assertions,” 
he should be entitled to relief for reliance on such statements.128 The
court disagreed.129 
The Payne court cited to the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Miller v. Premier Corp., holding “that the questions 
of ‘superior knowledge’ and of ‘reasonable reliance’ are intertwined.”130 
In applying this principle, the court determined that the issue was 
“[w]hether reliance on future projections of profit [wa]s reasonable,” 
which depended “both upon the manner in which the projections [we]re 
represented and what in fact was known by the person claiming inferior 
knowledge.”131 
In applying these principles, the Payne court determined that the
franchisee was not in a position to claim inferior knowledge.132  In fact, 
the court noted that the franchisee possessed “extensive knowledge 
concerning the cost of constructing franchised McDonald’s restaurants 
and the profits which might be expected to accrue from the operation of 
such restaurants, as well as an understanding of the impact which new 
restaurants in the area might have on his [other] facility.”133  Thus, the
125. For example, McDonald’s breach of the license agreement, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and other fraud based claims. See id. at
Here, the assertions that the franchisee relied upon were all predictive statements, 
751. 
126. See id. at 751–54. 
127. Id. at 760. 
128. Id. at 761 (citing Miller v. Premier Corp., 608 F.2d 973, 981 (4th Cir. 1979)).
including “the projected cost of the rebuilding of the Broadway facility, the projected
profits of the Broadway restaurant after it was rebuilt and the projected impact of the 
new restaurants on sales at the Broadway location.”  Id.  Defendant franchisor argued
that these assertions addressed the potential of what could occur, and therefore, were not 
actionable as fraud.  Id.
 129. Id.
 130. Id. at 761 (citing Miller, 608 F.2d at 981). 
131. Id.
 132. Id.
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court held that it was not reasonable for the franchisee to rely on the 
franchisor’s future predictions when the franchisee was such a sophisticated
investor.134 
These cases suggest that the reasonableness of a franchisee’s reliance 
upon the franchisor’s statements depends upon the sophistication of the 
franchisee.  If the franchisee has previously negotiated franchise agreements
or knows the intricacies of the business, courts may be less likely to find 
that its reliance on the franchisor’s statements is reasonable.  However,
this situation may be different if the franchisee is deemed inexperienced. 
B. The Inexperienced Investor 
Although courts may be unwilling to provide more protections for 
sophisticated franchisees, some courts have granted these additional 
protections when the franchisee had no prior business experience and 
relied on statements made by an experienced franchisor.135  In the latter
situation, the inexperienced franchisee’s reliance on statements made by
the experienced franchisor may be deemed reasonable, making the
franchisor liable for any breach of those statements.136  The facts are 
crucial in these cases, which makes a thorough examination of a factually 
rich but—on legal grounds, at least—typical case for franchising fraud, 
Fisher v. Mr. Harold’s Hair Lab, Inc., important.  Fisher illustrates how 
the inexperienced franchisee may be shielded from the machinations of 
an unscrupulous franchisor.137 
Not only had [the franchisee] operated the Broadway restaurant itself for
almost twenty years before 1994, but he had also operated restaurants at his 
other three Baltimore locations over a period of many years. Moreover, in
1976 and 1978, he operated for several years two additional McDonald’s 
restaurants, one on Eutaw Street and the other on Liberty Road.  Both in 1988
and later in 1990, [the franchisee] had objected to the opening of new facilities 
in the vicinity of his Broadway restaurant. Expressing his firm disagreement 
with the predictions made by McDonald’s that the new restaurants would have 
minimal impact on sales at the Broadway facilities, [the franchisee] had his 
own decided views on the matter. Under such circumstances, it can hardly be
claimed that [the franchisee] relied to his detriment on McDonald’s predictions. 
Id.
 134. See id.
 135. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 110, § 283. 
136.  See id. 




































In Fisher, the Kansas Supreme Court found that the plaintiff franchisee
had reasonably relied on statements made by the defendant franchisor, 
which induced him to purchase the franchise to his detriment.138 The
franchisors, Harold and Carolyn Wilborn, were sole stockholders of the 
corporation Mr. Harold’s East—Your Toupee Establishment (Mr. 
Harold’s), which sold men’s hairpieces, toupees, and other services and 
supplies connected therein.139  The franchisee, Charles F. Fisher, was “a 
senior experiment test pilot with the Boeing Company,” whose “only
experience in business management had been some executive training 
furnished by Boeing.”140  After discussions with the Wilborns, Fisher
decided to purchase a Mr. Harold’s franchise, as well as the right to sell
franchises to others.141  However, Fisher soon encountered difficulties in 
selling franchises, and he “discontinued his efforts to sell [them].”142 
Subsequently, Fisher sued Mr. Harold’s and each Wilborn individually, 
claiming “eighteen specific fraudulent representations allegedly made by
the Wilborns and relied on by Fisher in entering into the agreements.”143 
The Wilborns argued that the alleged representations constituted opinion 
or puffing and Fisher had not relied upon them.144  The court disagreed.145 
Although the general rule is that for a “fraudulent concealment to be
actionable [it must] be material to the transaction,” and “[a] matter is
material if it is one to which a reasonable man would attach importance 
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question,” there
are exceptions.146  A misrepresentation of a material fact need not be
made if “a party to a bargain has made misrepresentations for the 
purpose of inducing action by the other, and the other party has acted, 
relying upon the misrepresentations.”147 
Ostensibly, this exception is intended to protect less sophisticated
parties who are bargaining with more sophisticated businesspersons.148 
138. See id. at 1035. 
139. Id. at 1028. 
140. Id.  Allegedly, Mr. Fisher desired to purchase a Mr. Harold’s franchise as a
business investment in case the aerospace industry continued to decline.  Id.
 141. Id. at 1029. According to the three agreements executed between the parties,
Mr. Fisher was entitled to own a franchise and to sell additional Mr. Harold’s franchises. 
Id.
 142. Id.
 143. Id. at 1030. 
144. Id. at 1033. 
145. See id.
 146. Id. (quoting Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 510 P.2d 198, 205 (Kan. 1973)).
147. Id. (quoting 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1490 (3d ed. 1970)).
148. See, e.g., Schott Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 976 F.2d
















     







    
[VOL. 51: 709, 2014] Fortune Favors the Franchisor 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
According to the Fisher court, if the parties have equal bargaining
power, then the franchisee “has no[] right to rely, since he is assumed to
be equally able to form his own opinion.”149  However, “where the terms 
of dealing are not equal, and the representor has superior knowledge of 
the subject, a statement which would otherwise be one of opinion will be 
regarded as one of fact.”150  Applying these principles, the Kansas Supreme 
Court found that although the statements made by the Wilborns to Fisher 
“regarding Mr. Harold’s fame might properly be regarded as puffing,”
the statements they made about having “thirty years’ experience with men’s
hair pieces and [that they] did not manufacture their own hair pieces” 
were not.151  Additionally, the representations the Wilborns made regarding
the “number of stores in operation” were not considered puffing.152 
The Wilborns also argued that Fisher’s claim was not actionable
because “where goods are open to the inspection of the buyer, he is 
presumed to be as competent a judge of their value as the seller.”153  Yet,
the court also noted an exception to this general rule: The general rule
“applies only where the parties stand on an equal footing and have equal 
means of knowledge, with no relation of trust or confidence existing
between them.”154  Moreover, in the instance that “one of the parties to a
bargain represents himself as having special knowledge or his position is 
such that business expectations suggest that he is better informed than 
members of the general public or if one of the parties is obviously in a 
disadvantageous bargaining position,” the weaker party would likely be 
where the relation between the parties is such that they do not deal at arm’s length or on 
equal terms).
149. Fisher, 527 P.2d at 1033 (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 10 (current version at 37 
C.J.S. Fraud § 21 (2014)). 
150. Id. (citing 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 10 (current version at 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 22 (2014))); 
see also Bank IV Salina, N.A. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 810 F. Supp. 1196, 1208 (D. Kan.
1992) (finding that where the person expressing the opinion possesses, or professes to
possess, superior knowledge of the subject or special information regarding it, the opinion
may be reasonably regarded as “fact”); Reynolds v. Mitchell, 529 So. 2d 227, 231 (Ala. 
1988) (same); Reeve v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 1378, 1383 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(same); McCollum v. P/S Invs., Ltd., 764 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. App. 1988) (same). 
151.  Fisher, 527 P.2d at 1033. 
152. Id.
 153. Id.
 154. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 171). 
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protected by allowing it to rely on statements made by the representor, 
which would not be actionable under normal circumstances.155 
Again, the Kansas Supreme Court found that Fisher was an
unsophisticated investor because he had no background in business,
certainly not in hairpieces, but was instead affiliated with the aerospace 
industry.156  Although Fisher did examine some of the hairpieces during 
the negotiations, the court determined that “he lacked the knowledge to 
assess the quality of the merchandise he saw.”157  However, the court
found that the law would not “deprive a defrauded party of relief 
because he had opportunity to investigate, when his lack of knowledge
was such that the investigation would disclose nothing to him.”158  Thus,
although Fisher did inspect some of the merchandise, he was not truly 
sure what he was inspecting; therefore, Fisher relied upon the Wilborns’ 
statements to his detriment.159 
Lastly, the Wilborns argued that their statements were not actionable 
because they were mere opinions or predictions relating to future profits
of the business.160  The general rule regarding opinions or predictions is
that these do not constitute fraudulent misrepresentations unless the 
misrepresentations “relate to some material past or existing fact.”161 
Nonetheless, the court noted that there was an exception applicable to 
this general rule, too, which establishes that 
[f]alse representations of future profits of a business may be so gross as to
constitute fraud, especially where the representor is experienced and has
superior knowledge of the business and the representee is inexperienced and
ignorant of the facts and prospects respecting such business. Thus, in some 
cases wherein the defendant was held liable for false predictions concerning
future profits or income, considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that
the defendant had or professed to have superior knowledge, whereas the
plaintiff did not have such knowledge and relied on the defendant’s statements. 
In this connection it is held that a positive statement concerning future rents, 
profits, or income implies that the speaker has knowledge of facts which justify
the prediction.162 
Further, the court found that if the weaker, or less sophisticated, party 
does rely on the opinions or predictions given by the stronger, or more 
sophisticated, party, then “courts will ordinarily give [the opinions or 
155. Id. at 1034 (quoting James R. Ahrens, Some Observations on the Law of 
Misrepresentation in Kansas, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 315, 326 (1970)).
156. See id.
 157. Id.
 158. Id. (quoting Wolf v. Brungardt, 524 P.2d 726, 728 (Kan. 1974)). 
159.  See id. 
 160. Id.
 161. Id.
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prediction] the legal effect of a statement of existing fact,” which means
that the statements could then be actionable in fraud as a past or existing 
material fact.163  Thus, statements that are deemed opinions or 
predictions, which generally are not actionable, may become actionable 
if an unsophisticated party relied upon the statements of a sophisticated
party.164 
The Kansas Supreme Court held that the Wilborns’ statements were
actionable in fraud.165  Fisher relied upon what normally would be
considered future predictions regarding the business’s annual return.166 
The fact that Fisher was not sophisticated in the hair business, and that
the Wilborns held themselves out as possessing superior knowledge of 
the business, transformed the Wilborns’ assurance that Fisher would have
an annual return of $25,000 from prediction to existing material fact. 
Therefore, this fraudulent statement was actionable because it induced 
Fisher to enter the transaction.167 
As set forth above, the reasonableness of a franchisee’s reliance on a 
franchisor’s representations of the franchisor often depends upon the
franchisee’s sophistication and business experience in the particular
franchise industry. In determining when prospective franchisees are 
sophisticated and thus less likely to be misled by the franchisor, courts 
consider a number of factors, including (1) the general business experience
of the franchisee,168 (2) the franchisee’s knowledge and experience in the
same line of business as the franchise,169 (3) the franchisee’s prior 
dealings with a particular franchise,170 and (4) the franchisee’s ability to 
protect itself from false or misleading statements.171  If the franchisee
has previously negotiated franchise agreements or has experience in the 
franchise’s industry, a court is likely to find its reliance on the franchisor 
163. Id. (quoting 37 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 154, § 181). 
164. See id.  Under this theory, opinions or predictions transform into existing
material facts, which then makes them actionable. See id.
1984) (holding that a franchisee with a background in investments was sophisticated). 
165. See id. at 1033–35. 
166. See id. at 1035. 
167. See id.
 168. See N. Am. Fin. Grp., Ltd. v. S.M.R. Enters., Inc., 583 F. Supp. 691, 698 (N.D. Ill.
 169. See id.
 170. See Payne v. McDonald’s Corp., 957 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Md. 1997)
(finding a franchisee sophisticated due to its extensive knowledge of the franchisor’s 
business).

























    
  
  
   
 
 





unreasonable. However, if the franchisee has little business experience,
particularly in the area of the franchise, a court will probably determine 
that it is an inexperienced investor and worthy of judicial protection.172 
As franchisees become more sophisticated and continue to enter negotiations
without legal representation, this analysis will be critical in determining 
if there is a need to protect individual franchisees in their dealings with
franchisors.173 
IV. WAYS THAT CONTRACT LAW CAN PROTECT FRANCHISEES 
A. Contract Law’s Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
“Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”174  Good faith is broadly
defined, but generally it requires the parties to act with “honest[y] in fact
in the conduct or transaction concerned.”175  Under  the  Uniform
Franchise and Business Opportunities Act of 1987, “[a] franchise or
business opportunity imposes on the parties a duty of good faith in its 
performance and enforcement,”176 and good faith is defined as “honesty 
in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade.”177 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is imposed upon the parties 
when the franchise agreement is formed178 and is intended “to prevent
arbitrary, malicious or abusive conduct, or conduct that deprives the 
other contracting party of the benefit of the bargain, and to preserve the 
172. It should be noted that some legislators have also followed the trend of courts 
in protecting unsophisticated franchisees.  For example, the Michigan legislature created
a law specifically “to remedy perceived abuses by large franchisors engaged in
manipulating, coercing or lying to unsophisticated investor franchisees.” Jerome-
Duncan, Inc. v. Auto-By-Te, L.L.C., 989 F. Supp. 838, 842 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (emphasis 
added); see also Geib v. Amoco Oil Co., 29 F.3d 1050, 1056 (6th Cir. 1994) (discussing
that under Michigan’s Franchise Investment Law, contractual provisions that permit a
franchisor to “refuse to renew a franchise without fairly compensating the franchisee” 
are “void and unenforceable” (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(d))). 
173. For a discussion of the general trends in the sophistication of franchisees, see 
supra Part III.A. For a discussion on the resistance of many franchisees to hire an
attorney, see supra Parts II.B and II.C.
 174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
175. Id. cmt. a (citing U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978)). 
176. See UNIF. FRANCHISE & BUS. OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 201 (1987). 
177. Id.  The comments following Section 201 of the Uniform Franchise & 
Business Opportunities Act note that the section adheres to the principles set forth in 
section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and in Uniform Commercial Code
section 2-103.  Id. cmt. 1. 
178. Id. cmt. 1.  For the various requirements for the formation of a contract, see 
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justifiable expectations of the parties to a franchise or business opportunity 
relationship.”179  However, the imposition of this duty is not the equivalent
of a fiduciary duty.180  Many courts have held that no fiduciary duties are
established by the creation of a franchise agreement,181 while only a few 
courts, whose reasoning has since been repudiated, have found that a 
fiduciary relationship is established between the franchisor and franchisee in
certain circumstances.182  Comment 1 of section 201 of the Uniform
Franchise and Business Opportunities Act explains the more limited
nature of the duty of good faith and fair dealing: 
The duty is imposed to modify and limit the exercise of discretion or power 
reserved in a contract, rather than add to or override substantive provisions of a 
contract, especially in longer term relational contracts which must, by their 
nature, reserve significant discretionary authority to provide marketing flexibility
over the term of the arrangement.183 
Although establishing a fiduciary relationship between the franchisor’s
lawyer and the franchisee can be a difficult burden to overcome, it is 
179. UNIF. FRANCHISED BUS. & OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 201 cmt. 1 (1987). The 
comment notes, however, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing “does not apply in
the give and take of bargaining preceding the formation of the agreement” and “[i]t is not 
intended to eliminate risk.” Id.
 180. Id.
 181. Id. (citing Bain v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 692 F.2d 43, 47 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
In Bain, the court held that
[i]n every contract there is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
on the part of both parties . . . .  However, although the existence of trust and 
confidence in another is inherent in all fiduciary relationships, its mere
presence does not suffice to automatically make either party to a business 
relationship such as here present a fiduciary in every aspect of that relationship.
Bain, 692 F.2d at 47 (citations omitted). 
182. For example, in Arnott v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), the court
found that the defendant, American Oil, breached its fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiff,
George Arnott, when American Oil entered into a lease agreement with Arnott to 
become a service station dealer for American Oil.  Id. at 881. Subsequently, American
Oil terminated the lease agreement and evicted Arnott from the station. Id. at 876.  The
court found that American Oil breached its fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing 
owed to Arnott by terminating the lease agreement without good cause.  Id. at 884.  The
court specifically noted, “the franchise relationship imposes a duty upon franchisors not
to act arbitrarily in terminating the franchise.” Id. at 882. 
183. UNIF. FRANCHISE & BUS. OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 201 cmt. 1 (1987) (citing
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty To Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 401 (1980); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles 














   
 

















   
   
more difficult to establish that a franchisor owes fiduciary duties to the 
franchisee itself.184 
The fact that the franchisor potentially owes the franchisee a duty of 
fair dealing does not necessarily establish fiduciary duties between the
franchisor’s attorney and the franchisee. The relationship of the franchisor 
and its lawyer is one based on agency law, where essentially the lawyer
is the agent of the franchisor, who is the principal.185  Accordingly, lawyers
owe fiduciary duties to their clients.186  Even though a fiduciary relationship 
may be established between franchisee and franchisor and between
franchisor and attorney, the presence of the relationships does not
automatically create a fiduciary relationship between the franchisee and
the franchisor’s lawyer. 
In the event that a fiduciary relationship is created between the
franchisor and the franchisee and the franchisor subsequently violates its
duties owed to the franchisee, liability is not automatically imposed on 
the franchisor’s agent, that is, its lawyer.187  Under agency law, the agent 
is not responsible for the principal’s negligent acts.188  If the agent were
to incur damages as a result of the principal’s negligence, then the agent 
would be entitled to indemnification from the principal for damages the 
agent incurred.189 
184. See Bain, 692 F.2d at 48 (holding that the franchisor and franchisee are not in
a fiduciary relationship); see also In re Sizzler Rests. Int’l, Inc., 225 B.R. 466, 473 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that a franchisor does not owe a franchisee a fiduciary
duty); Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 880 F.2d 149, 169 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding no special
relationship exists in a franchisor-franchisee relationship). 
185. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). 
186. See id. § 8.01 (“An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal’s 
benefit in all matters connected with the agency relationship.”); see also  RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000) (describing the fiduciary
relationship established between a lawyer and their client).
187. According to one practicing franchise lawyer, this may not always be true.  In 
recent years, franchisor lawyers have started to be named as parties in lawsuits between
the franchisor and franchisee.  Telephone Interview by Jason Parnell, Assistant to the 
Author, with Andrew A. Caffey, franchisor lawyer, Law Offices of Andrew A. Caffey
(June 8, 2012). In those lawsuits, the franchisee argues that the lawyer for the 
franchisor, as author of the disclosure documents, conspired with the franchisor to create 
inaccurate disclosure documents designed to mislead franchisees. Id.  Although in most, 
if not all, situations franchisors’ lawyers only acts as an agent for their clients, the
franchisees’ attorneys are, as a tactical matter, naming those lawyers as parties in order 
to squeeze money out of the lawyers’ insurance companies. Id.  According to the 
practitioner, “It is an ugly business—but a real one—that is plaguing those who practice 
franchising law.”  Id.
 188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.14 (2006). 
189. See id. cmt. b (“In general, a principal’s obligation to indemnify an agent
arises when the agent makes a payment or incurs an expense or other loss while acting 
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Unfortunately for the principal-franchisor, if the agent-lawyer violated 
their duty to the franchisee, assuming a duty has been established through 
the third-party beneficiary principle or otherwise under the Restatement
(Third) of the Laws Governing Lawyers,190 the franchisor could be held
liable in addition to the lawyer.191  However, if the lawyer owed the
franchisee no duty of care, then the franchisor alone would bear any
liability for negligence.192  Yet, the franchisor may then have a claim
against the lawyer for legal malpractice if the lawyer breached his duties 
owed to the franchisor.193 Nevertheless, even if the lawyer breaches
their duties to the franchisor, this is not an independent basis for the 
lawyer’s tort liability to the franchisee.194 
Therefore, for purposes of this discussion, although the franchisor and 
franchisee owe fiduciary duties to each other, the franchisor’s lawyer does
not automatically assume a fiduciary relationship with the franchisee as
well. Rather, the lawyer only owes the nonclient fiduciary duties in
limited circumstances, such as if the lawyer were to explicitly create an
attorney-client relationship with the franchisee or, more realistically, if 
the franchisee is a third-party beneficiary for the attorney’s legal advice.
Only in these limited circumstances would the franchisor’s lawyer be 
liable to the franchisee in a legal malpractice claim.  If franchisees were
generally able to hold franchisors’ attorneys liable, this would undermine 
the most fundamental purposes underlying the attorney-client relationship: 
ensuring that lawyers are zealous advocates for their clients, and enabling 
lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of communications between
themselves and their clients.  If lawyers owed a duty of care to their
opposing party, for example, the franchisee, this likely would prevent 
them from effectively representing their actual clients.  Additionally, it 
190. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchisee Protection Via Professional Responsibility 
Standards (Aug. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 51 (2000) (describing duty
of care a lawyer owes to nonclients, prospective clients, and clients).
191. See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03 (2006) (describing principal’s 
liability for tortious act of agent); see also id. § 7.01 (describing agent’s liability for 
tortious act to a third party).
192. Id. § 7.02 (“An agent is subject to tort liability to a third party harmed by the
agent’s conduct only when the agent’s conduct breaches a duty that the agent owes to the 
third party.”).
193. See  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (2000)
(discussing civil liability of lawyer to client for professional negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty). 




















   
 











    
  
could force lawyers to disclose confidential information in order to defend
themselves in negligence claims brought by these nonclients. 
In the event that an experienced, counseled franchisor  takes advantage
of an unrepresented franchisee, that franchisor would likely do so during 
the contract negotiation process.195  Neither section 201 of the Uniform
Franchise and Business Opportunities Act nor section 205 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts specifies that the franchisor owes the
franchisee a duty of good faith and fair dealing during the process of
forming the contract.196  Nonetheless, the comments accompanying this
section note, “Bad faith in negotiation, although not within the scope of 
this Section, may be subject to sanctions.”197  Violations of good faith and 
fair dealing during the negotiation of a contract could result from the 
presence of such factors as incapacity to bargain,198 duress,199 
misrepresentation,200 undue influence,201 or unconscionability during 
the negotiation process.202 
195. Franchise negotiations can include everything from procedural rights to
business terms. Telephone Interview with Lee J. Plave, supra note 92.  For example, a 
franchisee may be able to negotiate rate structure and renewal.  Telephone Interview
with Robert T. Joseph, supra note 72.  Negotiations will depend on the market, the type
of franchisor, and other market-related issues.  Id. Some franchisors will negotiate and
some will not. Telephone Interview with  Lee J. Plave, supra note 92. Moreover, some 
franchise lawyers believe that it is easier for a franchisee to negotiate with a new
franchisor than an older, more established one.  Telephone Interview with Robert T. 
Joseph, supra note 72.  Similarly, franchisees may have more success negotiating procedural
terms rather than attacking the basic economic terms of the franchise agreement.  Id.
Rarely, however, will franchisors negotiate terms—procedural or otherwise—that plainly
work to their detriment.  Telephone Interview with Lee J. Plave, supra note 92. 
196. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (imposing “a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in [the] performance and . . . enforcement” of a contract, 
which implies that a contract has already been established between the parties); see also
UNIF. FRANCHISE & BUS. OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 201 cmt. 1 (1987) (noting that the duty
of good faith and fair dealing “does not apply in the give and take of bargaining
preceding the formation of the agreement” and “is not intended to eliminate risk”).
197. See  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1981). These 
comments would also apply to the Uniform Franchise and Business Opportunities Act 
because comment 1 accompanying section 201 states that the section follows the 
principles espoused in section 205 of the Restatement of Contracts. See UNIF. FRANCHISE & 
BUS. OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 201 cmt. 1 (1987). 
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
199. See id. § 175. 
200. See id. § 164. 
201. See id. § 177. 
202. See UNIF. FRANCHISE & BUS. OPPORTUNITIES ACT § 106 (1987). For more on 
unconscionability—that a franchise agreement between represented franchisors and 
uncounseled franchisees is sometimes grossly unfair, both procedurally and substantively,
because of unequal bargaining power between the parties—see infra Part IV.B. 
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In Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River
Valley Cookies, Ltd., the plaintiff-franchisor sued the franchisee for
trademark infringement.203  The defendant-franchisee counterclaimed by 
asserting that the franchisor had terminated the franchise in violation of 
the franchise agreement.204  In reaching its decision, the court recognized 
that parties to a contract owe each other the duties of good faith and fair
dealing.205  Illinois case law precedent had previously defined this duty 
as “‘a determination of commercial reasonability,’” which ultimately
gave judges “carte blanche to declare contractual provisions negotiated
by competent adults unreasonable and to refuse to enforce them.”206 The
Cookie Co. court refused to follow this precedent.  Rather, in a 2-1 
decision by Judge Richard Posner, the court held, “There is no blanket 
duty of good faith; nor is reasonableness the test of good faith.”207 
Although parties to a contract owe each other the duty of good faith,
that duty “does not require parties to behave altruistically toward each
other; it does not proceed on the philosophy that I am my brother’s 
keeper.”208  The court found that if parties to a contract were their 
203. 970 F.2d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1992).  Franchisor claimed that the franchisee 
continued to sell their product under their name after the franchisee’s franchise terminated.
Id.
 204. Id.  Defendant also claimed a violation of the Illinois Franchise Disclosure
Act. Id.
 205. Id. at 279. 
206. Id. at 280 (citing Dayan v. McDonald’s Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 973 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984)).
207. Id.
 208. Id. In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Richard Cudahy concluded that the 
majority engages in speculation and ignores business reality and “puts the [franchisees] 
out of business.” Id. at 283 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).  Noting that the franchisees “have
far more to lose than does the [franchisor],” Judge Cudahy opined that the court’s factual 
review “is so lopsided as to be almost droll—if it were not serious business.”  Id.
Instead, it was the magistrate judge whose decision the appeals court overturned that had
a “detailed probing” of the facts that was “considerably more balanced and fair.”  Id. 
Equally disturbing to Judge Cudahy was the majority’s discussion of the Illinois 
Franchise Disclosure Act (ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 705/1–/44): 
Illinois did not enact this law because it thought franchisors were being abused 
by their franchisees, as the majority seems to believe.  Apparently, the legislators 
had not read enough scholarly musings to realize that any efforts to protect the 
weak against the strong would, through the exhilarating alchemy of economic 
theory, increase rather than diminish the burden upon the powerless.  I agree
that the thumb of judges ought not be placed on the scales of justice.  But
judges have no obligation to ignore the numerous thumbs already put down on 




























   
  
  
   
 
 
brother’s keeper, then this would ultimately impose a fiduciary duty
upon the parties, yet “parties to a contract are not each other’s
fiduciaries—even if the contract is a franchise.”209  The court ultimately
defined the good faith duty imposed upon the contractual parties not as 
one that is “reasonable” but rather as one that does not take “advantage
of gaps in a contract in order to exploit the vulnerabilities that arise 
when contractual performance is sequential rather than simultaneous.”210 
Only a violation of the latter would be considered acting in “bad faith” 
and render the contract, or a provision within, unenforceable.211 
Here, the court held that this would have been considered
unconscionable had the franchisor attempted to take advantage of the 
vulnerability of an unsophisticated franchisee.212  However, the court 
found that such was not the case and ruled that the franchise agreement 
was not unconscionable.213  The court further noted that, although
contract law prohibits parties from acting unconscionably, the law “does 
not provide remedies for spiteful conduct or refuse enforcement of
contractual provisions invoked out of personal nastiness.”214  This principle
Id.
 209. Id. at 280 (majority opinion) (citations omitted). 
210. Id. (citing Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership V. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593–96 
(7th Cir. 1991)).
211. See id.  As the court similarly noted in Morin Bldg. Prods. Co. v. Baystone 
Constr., Inc., 717 F.2d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 1983), a contract was established in bad faith, 
“not because any provision of the contract was unreasonable and had to be reformed but 
because a provision had been invoked dishonestly to achieve a purpose contrary to that
for which the contract had been made.”  Id.
 212. See id. This could have been accomplished if the franchisee had built an 
extremely profitable franchise and the franchisor, looking to appropriate the franchisee’s
profits, determined to cancel the franchise agreement based on the franchisee’s trivial 
violations of the agreement.  See id.
 213. Id. at 281.  The court held,
Not only were many of the violations not trivial, but there is no suggestion of 
exceptional performance by the [franchisee].  True, it was a new franchise, and 
it has been doing well ever since the incompetent manager was booted out; but 
it is in a prime location, and the company in negotiating the terms of the
franchise rated it a “good” franchise—one very likely to do well. 
Id. at 280. Moreover, the court found that the franchisor was not attempting to take over 
the franchise in this case. Id.
 214. Id. At oral argument, the franchisee’s lawyer denied that the franchisor had
behaved opportunistically and instead attributed the franchise’s termination to the spite 
of a franchisor officer.  See id. The court cited Proimos v. Fair Auto. Repair, Inc., 808 
F.2d 1273, 1275 (7th Cir. 1987), noting “[t]hough a number of states do recognize
liability in cases where out of pure spite a landowner builds a fence that blocks his 
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does not replace the duty of good faith, which protects parties to a 
contract against opportunistic behavior by the other party.215 
The court established a connection between the terms unconscionability
and commercial reasonableness.216  While the former is intended to
“prevent overreaching at the contract formation stage,” the latter infers
“that no one in his right mind would have agreed to” the terms of the 
contract as presented.217  The court noted that, although it is valuable to 
consider whether a contract is commercially reasonable in determining 
whether a contract is unconscionable, to find that a contract is commercially 
unreasonable does not mean that it is also automatically unconscionable.218 
Clearly, sustaining an action for a breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing is not an easy task.  For example, in Barnes v. Burger
King Corp., the franchisee, Zuri Barnes, signed a franchise agreement
with the franchisor, Burger King Corportion (BKC), to operate a Burger
King franchised restaurant.219  However, after Barnes allegedly was
compelled to close his restaurant,220 he brought an action against BKC
claiming, among other things, a breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.221  Barnes argued that BKC breached this covenant
by allowing another Burger King franchise to open in close proximity to 
its franchise location.222  The court disagreed.223 
The Barnes court acknowledged “that Florida contract law recognizes 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract.”224 
215. Id. at 281 (noting that the duty of good faith is intended to prevent 
opportunistic behavior, which is “designed to change the bargain struck by the parties in
favor of the opportunist[]”).  The Cookie Company court found that the franchisee failed 
to establish any opportunistic behavior on the part of the franchisor. Id.
 216. See id.  The court also noted that unconscionability is closely allied to “fraud
and duress.” Id.
 217. Id.
 218. See id.
219.  932 F. Supp. 1420, 1422 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
220. Barnes argued that he was forced to close his franchise because of substantial 
losses in profits he suffered as a result of another Burger King franchise operating five 
blocks from Barnes’s franchise in downtown Los Angeles, California.  See id. at 1424. 
221. Barnes’s complaint against BKC consisted of eight counts, including fraud in
the inducement, violation of the Florida Franchise Act, violation of the Florida Sale of 
Business Opportunities Act, breach of the implied covenant of noncompetition, breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, and a request for permanent and injunctive relief.  Id.
222. Id. at 1437. 
223. See id.
 224. Id. at 1437–38. 
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However, the court also noted that there are limits to the application of 
the covenant “and there are many circumstances under which courts will 
not allow a party to pursue a cause of action for breach of the implied
covenant.”225 The Barnes court identified two such circumstances: 
“[W]here application of the covenant would contravene the express 
terms of the agreement [and] where there is no accompanying action for 
breach of an express term of the agreement.”226 
For the first factor or circumstance, the court held that the “implied 
covenant of good faith should not be invoked to override the express 
terms of the agreement between the parties.”227  Here, the court found
that application of the covenant would not supersede the express terms
to which the parties had agreed because the franchise contract between
Barnes and BKC expressly permitted BKC to open additional franchise 
restaurants in the vicinity of Barnes’s franchise.228  Thus, the court 
would “not enforce Barnes’[s] claim for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith based on [BKC’s] opening of an additional franchise in
derogation of those express terms.”229 
As for the second factor, the court cited precedent establishing “that a 
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
cannot be maintained under Florida law absent an allegation that an
express term of the contract has been breached.”230  Thus, Barnes would
only be permitted to maintain a claim for breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing if he could sustain a claim for breach of at
least one of the expressed terms in the franchise agreement.231  The court 
found that “the unambiguous terms of the Franchise Agreement adequately 
establish[ed] that [BKC was permitted to] open additional franchises in 
the vicinity of Barnes’[s] franchise.”232  Accordingly, Barnes’s claim for 
225. Id. at 1438. 
226. Id.
 227. Id.; see also Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees in a Fringe Banking World: 
Striking the Balance Between Entrepreneurial Autonomy and Consumer Protection, 46
AKRON L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2013) (discussing the Barnes case with regard to materiality, 
disclosures, objective standards, and alleged fraud). 
228. See Barnes, 932 F. Supp. at 1438. 
229. Id.
 230. Id. at 1439 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, No. 90-2191-CIV-MARCUS 
(S.D. Fla. 1995), aff’d, 169 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Alan’s of Atlanta, Inc.
v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1429 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding the covenant is not an
undertaking that can be breached apart from expressed contract terms); Burger King
Corp. v. Holder, 844 F. Supp. 1528, 1530 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is not actionable absent a breach of the contract’s express 
terms). 
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a
matter of law.
As Barnes demonstrates, the two-pronged test to sustain an action for
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a high
standard. Potentially, the easiest way for a franchisee to meet the burden 
is to claim that the franchise agreement is an adhesion contract or is
essentially unconscionable.  If the franchisee can sustain this claim, then 
the franchisee would be able to bootstrap a claim for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Moreover, courts are 
more likely to find that a franchise agreement is an adhesion contract or
unconscionable than to sustain a breach of the implied covenant. 
B. Unconscionable Franchise Agreements and Adhesion Contracts 
Franchise agreements present inherent dangers to franchisees, namely
that franchisors can offer to unsophisticated franchisees an uneven 
agreement.233  However, an uneven agreement does not go without
repercussions.  Courts will examine the fairness of the agreement from 
the point in time that it was negotiated, rather than focus solely on the 
relationship between the parties after the agreement has been signed.234 
In addition, after the agreement has been signed, the franchisor will owe 
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the franchisee.235 
Furthermore, if the franchisor attempts to uphold a clause of the agreement
and the franchisee disapproves, there could be a court battle to determine 
whether the agreement is unconscionable.236 
233. See Am. Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 431 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984); see also Joel Iglesias, Comment, Applying the Implied Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing to Franchises, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1423, 1453 (2004) (discussing 
the ability of franchisors to draft agreements to better control the franchise, leaving
franchisees “with few options for self-protection”). 
234. See Lee A. Rau, Implied Obligations in Franchising: Beyond Terminations, 
47 BUS. LAW. 1053, 1065 n.75 (1992) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
208 (1981)).
235. See Frank J. Cavico, The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the 
Franchise Business Relationship, 6 BARRY L. REV. 61, 66 (2006) (stating the contractual 
duties owed by the franchisor to the franchisee). 
236. See id. at 99.  The article gives an example about an arbitration clause: “Moreover,
if an arbitration clause in the franchise agreement is too one-sided, for example, by
requiring the franchisee but not the franchisor to arbitrate, a court may strike the 
arbitration clause down as an ‘unconscionable’ one.”  Id. at 98.  It should also be noted
that some courts find that unconscionability should be applied at the contract formation 










   
   
 
   
   
  
       
  
 










   
 
    
Frequently, courts will presume franchise agreements to be adhesion 
contracts because the “parties are in unequal bargaining positions, and 
the provisions are highly favorable to the franchisor while offering the 
franchisees little protection.”237  For example, in American Nursing Care
of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, the court was presented with the issue of
whether a franchise agreement between a franchisor and a franchisee 
was terminated and replaced by an oral agreement between the parties,
as claimed by the franchisee.238  In reaching its decision, the court noted 
that it would “exercise great caution in construing and applying the 
provisions of the license agreements in question” because of the
disproportionate bargaining power of the parties inherent to franchise 
agreements.239 
However, some courts are more reluctant to find that franchise
agreements are inherently adhesion contracts. Unlike consumer contracts
where only one party—the business—would be considered  sophisticated, 
franchise negotiation may bring at least a marginally sophisticated
businessperson to even the presumably weaker end of the bargaining 
table—the franchisee’s position.  Thus, although courts may be willing 
to find that regular consumer contracts are unconscionable or
adhesion contracts because of the disparate bargaining power between
the parties, courts may be less inclined to find such unequal bargaining 
power between franchisors and franchisees.  This result may be because 
franchisees receive federally mandated disclosures from the franchisor or
& RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18.8 n.7 (4th ed. 2010) 
(quoting Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 
970 F.2d 273, 281 (7th Cir. 1992)). These courts analyze whether the franchisor took 
advantage of the franchisee’s ignorance or desperation prior to signing the contract “to 
force unreasonable terms upon them.” See id. (quoting Cookie Co., 970 F.2d at 281). 
237. 62B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 110, § 174; see also Spandorf & Krakus, supra
note 33, at 1 (citing Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 
2001); Bolter v. Super. Ct., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 893 (2001)) (“Franchise law has long
characterized franchise agreements as adhesion contracts.”).
238. See 609 F. Supp. at 426.  The franchisor claimed that no such agreement was 
ever concluded. Id.
 239. Id. at 431.  The court held that there was no oral agreement that superseded
the written franchise agreement as contended by the franchisee. Id. at 426.  The court 
also noted that “[a]ll parties understood that a fair price would be paid for equity
interests, but the parties never proceeded to the point of setting a definitive price or 
number of shares.” Id.  Additionally, “[t]he franchisees were represented by counsel 
through these discussions.” Id.  The court ruled in favor of the franchisor, holding that 
the franchisee breached the franchise agreement. See id. at 431–32.  However, the court
was unwilling to enforce the provision that stipulated the franchisee could not compete 
with the franchisor because the franchisor failed to establish that the time and area these 
covenants covered was reasonable.  See id. at 433. For a review of franchise-related 
noncompetition agreements, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchising Covenants Against
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other protections through state franchising laws.240 The receipt of 
disclosures and the existence of state law protections may somewhat
supplement, but certainly does not replace, the effect and benefit of a 
franchisee having an attorney at the negotiating table. 
Yet, courts still seem reluctant to provide franchisees with more
protection. For example, similar to Cookie Co., where the court concluded 
that the franchisees were sophisticated businesspersons, the Seventh 
Circuit found a franchise agreement’s arbitration clause to be enforceable 
because it did not create an unfair surprise to the franchisee.241  In fact,
in We Care Hair Development, Inc. v. Engen, the court cited Cookie Co. 
and found that the franchisees were “‘not vulnerable consumers or 
helpless workers,’ but rather ‘business people who bought a franchise,’”
and they were not “forced to swallow unpalatable terms.”242 
240. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 436.1–.11 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-72-206 (2013); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20010 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-133f(f)
(West 2010); D.C. CODE § 36-303.01(a)(9) (LexisNexis 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. §
482E-6(2)(F) (2008); IND. CODE § 23-2-2.7-1(5) (2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523H.4 
(West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 14-226 (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 445.1527(b) (West 2002); MINN. R. 2860.4400(D) (2013); NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 87-406(1) (2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:10-7(a) (West 2012); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 37-5A-86 (repealed 2008). 
241. See We Care Hair Dev., Inc. v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 1999).  The 
court noted, “Before signing the franchise agreement and the sublease, each franchisee 
was provided with a copy of the uniform offering circular which clearly disclosed that 
the leasing company could bring eviction proceedings for any breach of the sublease,
including a breach of the franchise agreement.” Id.; cf. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc.,
469 F.3d 1257, 1282 (9th Cir. 2006). The Nagrampa court held,
Although franchise agreements are commercial contracts they exhibit many
of the attributes of consumer contracts.  The relationship between franchisor
and franchisee is characterized by a prevailing, although not universal, inequality of
economic resources between the contracting parties.  Franchisees typically, but 
not always, are small businessmen or businesswomen or people like the 
[defendants] seeking to make the transition from being wage earners and for 
whom the franchise is their very first business.  Franchisors typically, but not
always, are large corporations.  The agreements themselves tend to reflect this
gross bargaining disparity. Usually they are form contracts the franchisor 
prepared and offered to franchisees on a take-it- or leave-it basis.
Franchising involves the unequal bargaining power of franchisors and
franchisees and therefore carries within itself the seeds of abuse.  Before the
relationship is established, abuse is threatened by the franchisor’s use of 
contracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
Id. (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373–74 (1996)). 
242. We Care Hair, 180 F.3d at 843 (citing Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip




























   
 
 
    
 
Further, in Choice Hotels International, Inc. v. Chewl’s Hospitality, 
Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit defined a contract 
of adhesion as “one that is ‘drafted unilaterally by the dominant party
and then presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to the weaker party who 
has no real opportunity to bargain about its terms.’”243  Here, the court 
made an explicit distinction between consumer contracts and commercial
contracts and found that franchise agreements fall within the latter 
category.244  The court cited the trial court’s findings that the defendant 
franchisee was “not an unsophisticated consumer,” but rather “an
experienced hotel franchise owner, having purchased at least one other
franchise in the past,” and held that the franchisee could not demonstrate
that these findings were clearly erroneous, an extremely high standard to 
meet.245  Thus, the court held, as the We Care Hair court did, that the
arbitration clause included within the franchise agreement was not
unconscionable.246 
discussion of holdings that alleged franchisees are in fact mere employees, such as in 
Awuah v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 80, 85 (D. Mass. 2010), see Robert W. 
Emerson, Assessing Awuah v. Coverall North America, Inc.: The Franchisee as a
Dependent Contractor, 19 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. (forthcoming 2014). For a discussion
on the idea that franchisees and consumers can and should be treated similarly, see
Robert W. Emerson, Franchisees as Consumers: The South African Example, 37 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 455 (2014). 
243. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc. v. Chewl’s Hospitality, Inc., 91 F. App’x 810, 815
(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Meyer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 582 A.2d 275, 278 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1990)). This is the definition of adhesion contract in accordance with
Maryland law. Id. at 815. 
244. See id.
 245. Id.  The court further noted,
[The franchisee] has not demonstrated that it had no viable alternatives, or that
it faced the possibility of being excluded from the hotel franchise business if it
had refused such an arbitration contract.  Rather, the facts of this case suggest 
that [the franchisee] made a conscious decision to contract with Choice Hotels 
and change its affiliation, because it believed that the Quality Inn mark, as 
opposed to the Holiday Inn mark, would increase profitability.  Further,
addendums to the Agreement make clear that at least some negotiations took 
place before the Agreement was finalized, and that [the franchisee] willingly 
accepted the burdens of the franchise agreement.
Id.
 246. Id. In its motion, the franchisee relied on Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
which held that an arbitration clause was unconscionable, not merely unenforceable
against the franchisee.  See Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  However, the Ticknor holding concerned Montana law, rather than the 
Maryland law applied in Chewl’s Hospitality. Under Montana law, an adhesion contract
is one that “lacks mutuality of obligation, is one-sided, and contains terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the drafter” and is essentially decided “as a matter of public 
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Nonetheless, courts may be more willing to find that a franchise
agreement is an adhesion contract when counsel represented the franchisor 
during negotiation, but the franchisee had no such representation.  In 
such instances, franchisors’ attorneys draft the franchise agreement, which
commonly favor their clients over the nonclient franchisees.  However, 
unbeknownst to many attorneys, “[l]awyers writing standard form contracts 
for clients to use in recording transactions with parties not represented
by counsel have a professional duty to restrain their zeal.”247  Rather, 
what many attorneys do, while drafting contracts on behalf of their 
clients, is limit their clients’ liability and the adverse parties’ procedural 
rights, such as
(1) a convenient forum, (2) trial by jury, (3) a public hearing, (4) an impartial 
judge, (5) one who is accountable to a higher court for his or her adherence to
the governing law, (6) exemplary or treble damages if provided by controlling
law, (7) provisional remedies such as preliminary injunctions or attachments,
(8) the traditional American rule with respect to the taxation of attorneys’ fees,
(9) the right to conduct a private investigation of possible wrongdoing and gain
access to the information of an adversary through the use of modern discovery
rules, and (10) the right to participate in a class action.248 
Although all of these procedural rights can be legally waived by
contracting parties, the concern is whether franchisees are waiving these
rights without truly understanding what the waiver means. Franchisees
may give up rights “before they are engaged in a dispute [and thus before 
they could] reasonably be expected to contemplate future disagreement.”249 
Without the franchisee being represented by counsel during negotiations, 
the franchisee is even less likely to consider the potential for future 
disagreements with the franchisor and even more likely to “have little or
no bargaining power with the firm that is imposing its business form on [it] 
as a record of an unnegotiated transaction.”250 
Further, negotiations between a franchisor and franchisee place the
franchisee in a delicate situation.  Much like a person seeking employment, 
a franchisee could not easily ask the franchisor or its counsels what
rights the franchisee would have if sued by the franchisor.251  Rather, if a
247. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 361, 361
(2002).
248.  Id. at 362. 
249. Id.
 250. Id. at 363. 
251. See id. at 366. The article notes that a prospective employee, or likely



























   
     
  
   
    
 
  
prospective employee or franchisee were to pose such a question, it 
would not likely be received positively.252  Prospective franchisees and 
employees do not ask such questions because they lack bargaining 
power and fear that they will not become employees or franchisees if
they step on the employer’s or franchisor’s toes.253  If “small franchisees
had the power to secure fair terms, there would be no need for legislation 
to protect them.”254 
This argument proposed by some scholars would likely not be 
persuasive in those courts that routinely find franchisees are sophisticated 
businesspersons who are not forced to swallow the terms of a franchise
agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.  Rather, these courts are more
likely to find that franchise agreements are fair and enforceable because
“they are made between business people who are familiar with bargaining 
and the process of allocating risks.”255  This principle would likely even
be true in the situation where counsel does not represent the franchisee
during the negotiation process with the franchisor and its counsel.  Because
courts rarely find commercial contracts unconscionable, an unrepresented 
franchisee that agrees to an adhesion contract is unlikely to receive
judicial protection.256 
Thus, jurisdictions vary widely in finding that a franchise agreement is 
unconscionable.  Some jurisdictions view franchise agreements as
inherently being adhesion contracts, finding that franchisees do not have
the same bargaining powers as franchisors.  Yet, other jurisdictions find
that franchisees are sophisticated parties who are capable of bargaining
for terms of the franchise agreement with the franchisors, even if the
franchisor was represented and the franchisee was not during contract 
negotiations with the franchisor.  These latter courts have also found that 
the terms of franchise agreements are generally not drafted on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis. Accordingly, they do not see franchisees as being 
forced to accept unconscionable terms in order to acquire the franchise.
question, but only if “he was an extraordinary talent in great demand in the employment 
market.” Id. at 367. 
contract unconscionable, and are more willing to do so for consumer contracts. See id.
252. See id.
 253. See id.
 254. Id.
 255. GARNER, supra note 13, § 8:37.  Moreover, courts will rarely find a commercial 
256. However, this situation might be different if the franchisee was an individual 
rather than a business entity. When there are negotiations between two businesses,
courts likely will not find the business franchise was composed of unsophisticated 
parties.  Yet, if the franchisee were an individual negotiating with a represented business 
franchisor, the court may be more willing to find the commercial contract unconscionable. It
may also matter whether the individual franchisee had ever owned a franchise before,
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Whether a franchise agreement is viewed as an adhesion contract or a 
contract negotiated by parties of equal bargaining powers will vary
largely by jurisdiction and applicable state case law.  Even so, how
sophisticated must a franchisee be before courts are likely to find equal
bargaining power between the franchisee and the franchisor?257 
V. HOW REQUIRED DISCLOSURES CAN PROTECT FRANCHISEES
In 2007, the FTC announced revisions to its Franchise Rule (Amended 
Rule).258  One year later, the FTC made compliance with the Amended 
Rule mandatory.259  As promulgated nearly thirty years earlier, the
Franchise Rule initially required that disclosures about a franchise’s 
financial performance include costs, expenses, profits, earnings, and
other methods of calculating the financial soundness of the company.260 
However, the Amended Rule does away with the requirements of revealing 
costs and expenses when making claims about financial performance.261 
Furthermore, the Amended Rule extends the time of the disclosure 
deadline.262  The franchisor must submit disclosure documents no later
than two weeks before either a payment is made or an agreement is
executed, or at any time upon the reasonable request of the franchisee.263 
Additionally, the Amended Rule no longer makes it a requirement to
submit the final franchise agreement five days before signing.264  However, 
if the franchisor makes material changes to the document, the final 
agreement must be submitted to the franchisee seven days before 
signing.265 Furthermore, the Amended Rule expands the methods for
257. For a discussion of how the Model Rules of Professional Conduct can protect 
unrepresented franchisees, see Emerson, supra note 190. 
258. Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. 
Reg. 15,444 (Mar. 30, 2007) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436, 437); see also Gerald C. 
Wells & Dennis E. Wieczorek, A Road Map to the New FTC Franchise Rule, 27
FRANCHISE L.J. 105, 105 (2007) (providing an overview of the Amended Rule and its
implications for the franchise industry).
Amended Rule); 16 C.F.R. § 436.9(e) (2013) (same). 
259. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 105. 
260.  Id. 
 261. Id.
 262. See id. at 106–07. 
263. Id.; see also 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2013) (setting forth the requirements of the 
264. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(b) (2013); 16 C.F.R. § 436.9(e) (2013). 
265. 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(b). The FTC lists traditional hard copy, fax, CD-ROM, e-




















   
 
      
  
 
   
submitting the disclosure to include e-mail or website submissions,
followed by any necessary instructions to guide the franchisee in viewing 
the document.266  The disclosure documents must be stored for review as 
well.267 
The Amended Rule also includes substantial changes to the disclosure 
document itself.  The cover page of the disclosure document must 
“reference sources of additional background information that prospective 
franchisees can use in investigating the franchise,” “include the e-mail 
and website for the franchisor,” “contain various warnings about document 
holding periods and other matters,” and disclose the investment needed 
to begin franchise operations and the amount that must be paid to the 
franchisor.268  Within the document, the Amended Rule requires franchisors
to reveal the name of their parent company and the address of their 
principal business.269  Similarly, the franchisor is also required to reveal 
the names of a “broad range of people” that have “management
responsibility” over the company, any actions involving affiliates, any 
action that is material when considering the number of franchises, and
any settlements or litigation finding the company liable after the Amended 
Rule was enacted.270 
The franchisor additionally has the responsibility of updating the 
franchisee on any actions that involved the franchisor as a plaintiff in the 
last fiscal year.271  The Amended Rule requires that the franchisor inform
the franchisee about how the franchisor will provide assistance in the 
process of maintaining the franchise, “including advertising assistance,
training, operations manuals, and required computer systems.”272 
However, the Amended Rule does not require the franchisor to submit 
financial performance information.273  Instead, the franchisor must inform
the franchisee in the preamble of the disclosure document that the
266. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(g) (2013). 
267.  See 16 C.F.R. § 436.6(h) (2013). 
268. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 107; see also 16 C.F.R. § 436.3
(2013).
269. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(a)(1) (2013).  According to Wells & Wieczorek, the
purpose of revealing the parent company is to “alert prospective franchisees of 
competing company-owned outlets.”  Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 107. 
270. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 107–08; accord 16 C.F.R. §
436.5(c)(1)(i)(B) (2013). 
271. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(c)(1)(ii) (2013).  According to Wells & Wieczorek, the 
“FTC’s goal is to give a prospective franchisee more information on the nature and level 
of disputes within a franchise system.”  Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 108. 
272. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 108; accord 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(k) 
(2013).
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franchisor chose not to disclose the financial performance information.274 
The Amended Rule updates the use of charts to summarize, in a more
concise, reader-friendly manner, the number of outlets and transfers, as 
well as other information regarding the franchise system.275  The franchisor
also has the responsibility to inform the prospective franchisee of the 
existence of confidentiality agreements with current franchisees.276 
Franchise associations “created, sponsored, or endorsed” by the franchisor 
must also be revealed to the franchisee.277  In regards to outlets, franchisors 
must reveal:
[I]nformation for each previous owner of the outlet in the last five years, the
ownership period for each previous owner required to be disclosed, the reason 
for each previous ownership change during the last five years, and the periods
when the franchisor retained control of the outlet in the last five years.278 
Additionally, the franchisor must include more information in the 
audited financial statements, including the financial statements of the 
parent company, in limited circumstances.279  Meanwhile, the Amended 
Rule gives the franchisor more time to update its audited financial 
statements.280  After the document has been submitted, the Amended 
Rule requires the franchisee to acknowledge receipt of the disclosure 
document.281  Lastly, the Amended Rule prohibits waivers of franchisor
liability for misrepresentations in the submitted disclosure document.282 
Although the Amended Rule includes new requirements for disclosure, 
the Amended Rule does not affect a state’s right to include additional 
requirements for disclosure.283  For example, Maryland, New York, and 
Rhode Island kept an old FTC requirement that sets the deadline for 
disclosure at the date of the first meeting.284  Many states also have a
274. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(s)(2) (2013). 
275.  See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(t)(1)–(3) (2013). 
276. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 109; see also 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(t)(7)
(2013) (setting forth the requirement for disclosing confidentiality agreements). 
277. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 109; accord 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(t)(8)
(2013).
278. Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 109; accord 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(u)(1)
(2013).
279.  See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(u)(1)(v) (2013). 
280.  See 16 C.F.R. § 436.7(a) (2013). 
281. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(w) (2013). 
282. See Wells & Wieczorek, supra note 258, at 110. 
283. Id. at 105 (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 436.10(b) (2013)).













   
   















   
  
  
franchise regulatory agency, which a franchisor must register with and
obtain approval from before marketing a franchise business.285  Furthermore,
most states have enacted consumer fraud or deceptive trade practices
acts, which allow for a private cause of action for violations of the FTC
franchise rules.286 
Nevertheless, some commentators still argue that more protection for 
franchisees may be needed.  For example, some argue that franchisees
should be given more disclosure, or put more bluntly, “straight talk,” 
about the realities of what could happen when the franchisor-franchisee 
relationship terminates.287  In contrast, others argue that state consumer 
protection legislation should expressly include the purchase of a 
franchise.288 Additionally, these commentators propose that a private
cause of action should be adopted at the state or federal level, which 
would allow a franchisee to sue its franchisor for misrepresentations or 
failure to comply with disclosure requirements.289  This private cause of 
action would allow recovery of attorney’s fees, in addition to damages,
to lessen the economic burden of litigation on franchisees.290 
Overall, the goal of the FTC’s Amended Rule and other state law 
requirements for disclosure statements is to address the issue of
unsophisticated franchisees.291  The myriad of required presale disclosures
serves to inform the franchisee of the franchise situation it is about to 
285. Manitoba Law Reform Comm’n, Consultation Paper on Franchise Legislation, 8
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 181, 225 (2008) (detailing various differences 
between state and FTC disclosure laws); see also Debra Burke & E. Malcolm Abel II, 
Franchising Fraud: The Continuing Need for Reform, 40 AM. BUS. LJ. 355, 371 (2003) 
(citing Robert W. Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 
43 VAND. L. REV. 1503, 1509–13 (1990)) (discussing how some state legislatures grant 
franchisees a private cause of action for any losses to the franchisee caused by the 
franchisor’s failure to comply with certain state laws).
286. Bryan Schwartz et al., Response to Consultation Paper on Franchise Law, 8 
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 253, 299 (2008) (detailing ways in which states 
enforce the FTC franchise rules); see also Burke & Abel, supra note 285, at 371–73
(listing ways in which state laws enforce FTC franchise rules through private rights of 
action).
287. See e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n, Thirty Years of Franchising, 27 FRANCHISE L.J. 85, 
102 (2007) (reporting Rochelle Spandorf’s response to an American Bar Association
Forum on Franchising questionnaire).
288. See e.g., Burke & Abel, supra note 285, at 383–84. 
289. See id. at 384. Alternatively, these commentators suggest that if a state does 
not want to create a private cause of action for franchisees, the state should make any
violation of federal disclosure laws a violation of the state’s Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act. See id.
 290. See id.
 291. See Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72
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sign into.292  As the existence of such elaborate rules for the negotiation 
of franchise relationships suggests, unrepresented franchisees are a problem.
Franchisees are not only a problem to themselves but also a problem to
the system itself, as evidenced by the fact that even franchisors recognize 
the need for disclosure regulation.293  By requiring franchisors to submit
more information about the franchise, thereby making research into the
franchise that much easier for the franchisee, the FTC and state legislators 
have attempted to protect franchisees from the pitfalls of signing a
franchise agreement and franchisors from the economic impact of an 
unsuccessful franchise.294 
Public policies supporting franchise disclosure rules ultimately aim to 
protect the interests of both parties to the contract but particularly those 
of the franchisee.  These policies are not specific to franchise law, though.
Consumer, real estate, and marriage laws all favor or mandate disclosures,
292. James A. Meaney, Choice of Law: A New Paradigm for Franchise Relationships, 
15 FRANCHISE L.J. 75, 78–79 (1996) (discussing, in part, the role of franchise regulation
and disclosures in counteracting the effects of an “informational imbalance”). 
293. When the FTC surveyed public opinion on the Amended Rule in 2004, the 
Commission received many favorable comments about the Rule from franchisors.  See
FTC, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS AND PROHIBITIONS CONCERNING FRANCHISING: STAFF 
REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED REVISED TRADE REGULATION 
RULE (16 CFR PART 436), at 5–6 (2004). Among the supporting franchisors was Cendant, a
publicly traded company that owns several franchise systems, including Howard 
Johnson, Ramada, Century 21, Coldwell Banker, ERA, and Avis Rent-A-Car. Id. 
Clearly, the Amended Rule not only protects franchisees, but it can also confer broad 
benefits to honest, ethical franchisors who engage in fair sales practices and thus, 
continue to survive.  That is, these honest franchisors engaging in only ethical practices 
find it easier to compete in franchisee recruitment when other franchisors play by the 
rules, too.  Other franchisors supporting the Amended Rule included Better Homes & 
Gardens Real Estate Service, Re/Max Corporation, The Prudential Real Estate Affiliates,
Inc., Snap-On, Inc., Little Caesars, The Southland Corporation (7-Eleven), Medicap
Pharmacies, Forte Hotels, Atlantic Richfield Company, Papa John’s Pizza, and PepsiCo 
Restaurants—Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, KFC, Inc. Id. at 6 n.16. 
294. Some practitioners believe that under the current disclosure system, 
prospective franchisees still do not conduct thorough enough research on the franchises 
for which they are signing agreements.  E-mail Interview by Jason Parnell, Assistant to 
the Author, with Rupert Barkoff, franchisor lawyer and Senior Counsel, Kilpatrick 
Townsend & Stockton LLP (May 12, 2012).  In some cases, when the lawyer believes
the prospective franchisee has performed insufficient research or is seeking counsel too 
early in the process, the lawyer will not accept the representation and will ask the 
prospective franchisee to do more research before seeking to hire the lawyer.  Telephone
Interview by Jason Parnell with Rochelle Spandorf, supra note 109.  These lawyers
recognize that legal representation is expensive and believe that prospective franchisees
should do their homework before calling a law firm.  Id.
757
   










   
 
    
  
  
   
  
   
 
   
 
  





     
 
perhaps going so far as to require a party to seek counsel.295  As mentioned 
earlier, many states have consumer fraud and deceptive trade practice
laws that require those who are selling a service or a product to disclose 
pertinent information to the consumer and not to misrepresent the
information.296 
State consumer protection laws may have implications in other areas 
of law as well.  For example, one type of consumer fraud law can be seen in
the Federal Truth in Lending Act, which attempts to shield consumers 
from misrepresentations by lenders and requires certain information to
be disclosed to consumers before they take out a credit card or receive a
loan.297  Furthermore, various states, such as Illinois, have consumer and
commercial protection acts that require disclosure of information regarding 
the purchase or sale of real estate and rentals.298  Perhaps the strictest of 
all the protection laws is one that does not concern consumers—marital 
law. States such as New Jersey and California require not only that 
pertinent information be disclosed to a party but also that independent 
legal counsel represent the party or that the right to independent legal 
counsel be waived before signing various types of marital agreements.299 
If independent legal counsel does not represent a party, there may be a
presumption that the contract was not signed “voluntarily” and is therefore
unconscionable or void.300  This same result can be found in the fiduciary
context where a transaction between a trustee and a beneficiary may be
presumed voidable if the beneficiary does not obtain independent legal 
295. See, e.g., Johnston v. Weil, 946 N.E.2d 329, 335–38 (Ill. 2011) (discussing
required disclosure for marriages in Illinois); 1 HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. 
CHASE, CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES AND CREDIT REGULATION § 1 (2013)
(discussing consumer laws that require disclosure); 54B CAL. JUR. 3D Real Estate § 1258
(2013) (discussing real estate disclosure requirements in California). 
296. See supra note 286 and accompanying text. 
297. See Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory
Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 199, 210–11 (2005).
298. See Robert W. Gray, The Applicability of Constructive Eviction, Implied Warranty 
of Habitability, Common-Law Fraud, and the Consumer Fraud Act to Omissions of
Material Facts in a Commercial Lease, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1289, 1289–90 (2005) 
(discussing Illinois consumer real estate protection). 
299. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(c)(1) (West 2014) (discussing California’s
requirement that parties to a premarital agreement either retain independent counsel or
voluntarily waive the right to do so); Andrew J. Kyreakakis, Antenuptial Law in New
Jersey, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 254, 282–83 (1993) (discussing the requirement of 
independent legal counsel for each spouse dealing with a prenuptial agreement in New 
Jersey). 
300. See Judith T. Younger, Lovers’ Contracts in the Courts: Forsaking the
Minimum Decencies, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 349, 360–61 (2007) (discussing, 
in part, California marital disclosure laws that require a party to have independent 
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counsel.301  Under these circumstances, merely urging the beneficiary to 
obtain independent legal counsel will not be sufficient to avoid the 
presumption.302 
Whether the Amended Rule has led to the intended effect of sufficiently 
informed and capable franchisees remains to be seen.  In this Author’s
survey of franchise counsel, 51.1% of respondents claimed that the 
percentage of franchisees represented by lawyers at closing has stayed
about the same in the past ten years.303  Meanwhile, only 24.1% of 
respondents claimed the percentage has increased.304  The change in the
number of franchisees seeking knowledgeable counsel may not be 
enough to meet the public policy goals underlying disclosure laws.  If 
the current disclosure laws are not enough to change the course of
uncounseled franchisees, then changes to the number, substance, and 
enforcement of disclosure laws may need to be considered. 
VI. SOLUTIONS TO THE UNREPRESENTED FRANCHISEE PROBLEM 
One solution to the issue of unrepresented franchisees is to place
liability on the franchisor’s lawyer to inform the franchisee of the
importance of seeking independent counsel.  However, there are strong 
policy arguments to tread warily before imposing liability on franchisor 
lawyers for actions not taken with respect to their “opposite”—the pro se
party buying a franchise. 
A. Why Lawyers Should Not Be Liable to Nonclient Franchisees 
An argument for imposing liability on the franchisor’s lawyer for 
actions taken towards unrepresented franchisees is that it will encourage 
full disclosure to franchisees.305  By requiring lawyers to fully disclose
all material information to potential franchisees, it will equalize the 
discrepant bargaining power between franchisors and franchisees.306  If 
301. See GEORGE G. BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 544 (2d
ed. rev. 2013). 
302. See id.
 303. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 11. 
304. Infra Appendix, Franchise Lawyer Survey, Question 11. 
305. See Alexander M. Meiklejohn, UFOCs and Common Law Claims Against 
Franchise Counsel for Negligence, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 45, 63 (2005). 
306. See id. This is important because many franchisees are not financially situated 






















   
     
 
  
lawyers face the possibility of violating state or federal disclosure laws,
then lawyers would likely be more forthcoming with information to
potential investors.307  Additionally, supporters of this policy decision argue
that such disclosure will not threaten attorney-client confidentiality because 
the “lawyer-client privilege should not shield information that the franchisor 
is legally required to disclose.  Nor should it have any application to 
misleading information contained in a document designed to be read and 
relied on by third parties.”308 
A second policy reason for imposing franchisor lawyer liability arises 
from the lawyer’s role in the transaction as someone with “greater access
to the franchisor and its records,” and the amount of reliance placed on it 
by the franchisee.309  Throughout the transaction, a franchisee relies on 
information communicated to it by the franchisor’s lawyer and assumes 
that what the lawyer communicates is legally accurate because the lawyer is
better situated to know the relevant and applicable laws regarding the 
transaction.310  However, if information provided by the franchisor’s
lawyer is not legally accurate and the franchisee reasonably relies on it, 
307. See Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63; supra Part V.  However, in light of the 
“FTC’s limited enforcement resources and the lack of any private right of action under
its rule, common law litigation is an important means of ensuring compliance.” 
Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63. 
308. Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63–64. 
309. Id.  Such reliance may arise simply because the nature of the impending
franchisor-franchisee relationship is long term.  For singular transactions with little or no 
continuing relationship, business lawyers may burn bridges to obtain the most profitable 
outcome for their clients; however, a franchisor attorney’s best approach may not be to 
focus solely on maximizing the franchisor’s share of the pie.  Instead, for the relational 
franchise contract, both sides’ long-term satisfaction with the arrangement is helpful, if
not outright necessary, to meet the best interests of both parties, and franchisors may
need to understand that when contracting with an unrepresented franchisee. See Andrew
C. Selden & Victoria Blackwell, Franchise Relationship Management, in  FRANCHISE 
LAW COMPLIANCE MANUAL 313, 318 (Jeffrey A. Brimer ed., 2d ed. 2011) (stating,
among other things, “if the franchisor’s lawyer adequately disclaims on paper an 
equipment warranty but does not ensure that the franchisee understands the existence or
meaning of the disclaimer, the lawyer has done his client no good service when the 
equipment fails” and the franchisee feels “frustrated” and “aggrieved”).  Selden and
Blackwell note that franchisor-franchisee transactions are opportunities “to build trust 
and cooperation” between the parties, and they urge counsel “to remember at all times 
that the franchisor and franchisee will probably remain in business together at the 
conclusion of the transaction or dispute and that both share an overriding interest in a 
healthy and productive system.” Selden & Blackwell, supra, at 318. 
310. Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63; see Mark H. Miller, Unintentional Franchising, 
36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 301, 389 (2005) (discussing various ways in which franchisor 
lawyers have a duty to inform both parties that they are participating in a franchise
agreement.  Miller argues, “The duty of the lawyer includes the obligation to exercise 
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the franchisee could subsequently be liable for the actions it takes based 
upon the inaccurate information, unless the lawyer is held liable.311 
Similarly, because counsel is closely connected to the franchisors, they
are in a better position to advise the franchisors as to what information 
should be disclosed to the prospective franchisees, which, in turn, will 
result in more appropriate disclosure to the franchisees.312  Those who 
support this position argue that “encourag[ing] collaboration between 
lawyers and franchisors” will position the lawyer to better “fulfill his or 
her professional obligation to the franchisor.”313 
On the other hand, many argue that lawyers should not be liable to 
nonclient franchisees. One reason for this argument is that liability will
lead to defensive drafting, which would result in the disclosure of
meaningless negative information regarding the franchise system to
potential investors.314  Thus, the more the lawyer has to disclose, the
more likely potential investors will shy away from investing—a phenomena
seen in other fields of law.  This failure to invest is potentially to their 
detriment, as well as to the detriment of the franchisors and the franchise 
system in general.315 
311. See Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63.
 312. See id. Arguably, the franchisor’s counsel is also in a better position to assess 
his own liability for the franchisee’s reliance on information he provided because of his 
legal knowledge.  For example, the franchisor’s attorney already knows that he can be
liable for information that the franchisor reasonably relies on to his detriment. See id.
Because an attorney is generally in a better position to gauge the risk of reliance than the
reliant party, he can evaluate what information should be communicated to the franchisee.
See id. The franchisee, in contrast, is unlikely to fully appreciate the negative impact of
his reliance and may not be able to determine what information he needs to request.  See 
id.
 313. Id.
314. One practitioner notes that if more liability were imposed upon lawyers, it 
would not change his representation of his client.  Telephone Interview with Robert T. 
Joseph, supra note 72.  It would, however, prompt him to ask the unrepresented franchisee to
sign a disclosure, making the franchisee acknowledge that he is not the franchisee’s 
lawyer and that he agrees not to hold the lawyer liable.  Id.  In his opinion, more liability
for lawyers would simply mean more paperwork for the franchisee to sign, which may,
at least in the long run, not really make much of a difference. Id.  Similarly, another attorney
for franchisors says that more liability for lawyers would cause him to issue a pro forma
statement to unrepresented franchisees informing them that he is not their lawyer.  Telephone
Interview with Lee J. Plave, supra note 92. 
315. See Bradford Cornell & James C. Rutten, Collateral Damage and Securities 




































    
  
Although advocates for franchisor lawyer liability argue that it will 
result in more adequate disclosure, those opposing it argue that “liability
for negligence will not necessarily produce more accurate and 
comprehensive disclosure[s].”316  Instead, many lawyers argue that “the
result may be simply that [the franchisor’s lawyer] will devote substantial
amounts of time to documenting their own efforts to ensure accuracy
and comprehensiveness,” rather than spending the time attending to 
duties pertaining to the actual client, the franchisor.317  Indeed, lawyers
who prepare disclosure statements in other areas of law, such as those 
preparing securities disclosures, are able “to reduce their exposure by
delegating portions of the work to other professionals.”318 
Additionally, those who argue against liability claim that “[l]iability 
cannot be justified by reliance on the lawyer’s role.”319  Although it is
true that the franchisor’s lawyer prepares the offering circulars distributed to
potential franchisees and that the circulars must be in compliance with 
applicable investing laws, “the notion that [franchisees] somehow rely
on counsel is simply unrealistic if the circular reveals no evidence of the 
lawyer’s participation in the drafting process.”320  Without the franchisee
knowing that the lawyer participated in drafting the circular,321 there is
no way to establish that the franchisee relied on the information the
attorney supplied to be factually correct or legally accurate.322 
Further, it is the duty of franchisors’ lawyers, like any lawyer, to 
represent the interests of their clients and not the interests of another 
party, such as a prospective franchisee.323  The franchisor’s lawyer, therefore,
316. Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 64 (citing Erik B. Wulff, Is Franchisor Counsel 
Subject to Due Diligence Obligations? An Analytical Response, 4 FRANCHISE L.J. 3, 3 (1985)).
317. Id.
 318. Id. (citing Wulff, supra note 316, at 27). 
319.  Id. 
 320. Id.  This, of course, is a legal argument and does not take note of the often
faulty reasoning of prospective franchisees.  As many such people believe they need not
consult an attorney or they are capable of representing themselves, it is no stretch to
conclude that many prospective franchisees could wrongly assume that a lawyer prepared the
circulars and that a franchisee can therefore rely on that lawyer’s work—his assistance. 
See supra Part II.C.
321. For example, when there are stock or bond offerings in which the lawyer 
provides a signed opinion letter to accompany the offering.  Meiklejohn, supra note 305, 
at 64.
 322. Id.  Despite these potential risks, countries abroad have also chosen to adopt 
similar disclosure schemes.  France, for example, amplified its franchise regulation 
scheme in 1999 and requires franchisors to offer circulars to franchisees prior to the sale 
of a franchise. See David J. Kaufmann, An Overview of the Law of Franchising, in 
UNDERSTANDING FRANCHISING: BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES 55, 119 (Practising Law
Inst. ed., 2001). 
323. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 (2000)
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will create agreements that are favorable to the interests and objectives 
of the franchisor.324  To the extent that such agreements are one-sided, a
court will find them to be unenforceable.325  Although franchisors’ 
lawyers should advise their clients about the risk of such agreements and
perhaps offer suggestions to reduce those risks, these efforts are still not
aimed at protecting the prospective franchisee. Indeed, there may also be
business reasons for avoiding a one-sided agreement, such as the
inability to sell franchise opportunities because the franchise agreement
is unduly oppressive or simply to foster a good franchisor-franchisee 
relationship—a relationship that the franchisor lawyer must respect.326 
Nevertheless, these matters are still designed to protect the interests of 
the franchisor, not the franchisee.
Rather than hold lawyers liable, the courts should encourage potential 
franchisees “to conduct their own investigations and assessments of
franchise systems; to compare systems with one another and with other 
investments; and to seek expert advice from professionals, including 
accountants and lawyers with expertise in franchising.”327  If franchisees
were able to fall back on holding the franchisor’s lawyer liable, they 
might become less diligent and fail to properly research potential 
investments for themselves.  Also, it would be difficult for courts to
determine whether there exist grounds for imposing this liability. 
Ultimately, courts would be positioned to determine “whether or to
what extent negligent drafting has caused a particular loss,” and these
“[a]fter-the-fact claims of reliance on particular items in a disclosure
document will be easy to make and hard to refute, even if untrue.”328 
Another argument against liability is that it would be unfair to hold 
lawyers liable when the essential information that must be disclosed
324. See 62B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 110, § 174 (stating that franchise agreements
are written to be “highly favorable to the franchisor” (quoting Am. Nursing Care of 
Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 431 (N.D. Ohio 1984))). 
325. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 939–40 (9th Cir. 
2001) (finding an arbitration clause in a franchise agreement to be too one-sided and thus 
unenforceable).
326. See Fox & Su, supra note 39, at 284 (stating that a franchisee should not form 
a business relationship with a franchisor when the terms of the franchise agreement are 
oppressive); see also Cavico, supra note 235, at 103 (discussing the business benefits of 
a “rational, reasonable, fair, just, ethical, and honest” relationship between a franchisor 
and franchisee). 

















     
















comes from their clients, the franchisors.329  If the franchisor fails to 
disclose information to his attorney, and the lawyer, in turn, fails to
disclose the information to the potential investor, the lawyer could be 
held liable for his client’s nondisclosure, even if the lawyer has taken all 
necessary steps to ensure disclosure of such information.330  Further, the
lawyer “may well lack the resources to ferret out information that the 
client fails to provide” or “other kinds of expertise necessary to recognize 
red flags in information that the franchisor provides, such as discrepancies
in financial statements.”331 
Many opponents argue that “[l]iability will lead to disproportionately 
large damage awards.”332  At most, if the franchisor’s attorney is liable, 
it should be under a theory of negligence, not fraud.333  However, the
damages the potential investor may be awarded are of a more punitive 
nature.334  The awards are measured by “the difference between the value of
a franchise as it was represented and its actual value.”335  Accordingly, if
the franchisor does not properly disclose the requisite information to his 
attorney, and the attorney fails to either diligently pursue this information or
spot the warning signs, he may face a substantial damages charge.336 
These damages can accrue not only during the period that the franchisor
actively distributes the circular but also anytime the franchisor uses the
circular.337  Thus, the attorney is required “to continually monitor the
timeliness and accuracy of the disclosure document’s contents, changes in
the franchisor’s business condition, and the entire franchise program.”338 
Failure to do so may result in the attorney’s liability for massive damage
awards to investors.
Those who oppose holding the franchisor’s lawyer liable to the
unrepresented franchisee also argue that lawyer liability will have
a detrimental impact on the practice of law in general.  For example,
holding lawyers liable will detract from the loyalties owed to their clients 
329. See Ronald E. Mallen, Duty to Nonclients: Exploring the Boundaries, 37 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 1147 (1996) (discussing the increase in lawyer liability laws and the 
hardships on lawyers who may not anticipate a duty arising from the representation of a 
client). 
330. Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 64.
331.  Id. 
 332. Id.
 333. See id.
 334. See id.
 335. Id.
 336. See id.
 337. See id. (“[T]here is no time limit on the franchisor’s use of the circular.”).
338.  Id. (quoting Rochelle Buchsbaum Spandorf, The Case Against Courtney v. 
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because lawyers will be more likely to “consider their own interests in
the disclosure process rather than provid[e] completely disinterested advice 
to the franchisor.”339  This will likely threaten a client’s confidentiality 
in light of the attorney’s “self-protective concerns.”340 Attorneys will be
increasingly likely to disclose more information to potential investors for
fear of liability, in contradiction of the duties owed to their clients.341 
Therefore, holding lawyers potentially liable to nonclients places them in 
a position at conflict with the duties owed to their clients. 
Lawyer liability to nonclients may also result in an increase in the cost 
of franchise attorneys’ services and the unavailability of legal services.342 
Lawyers facing potential liability may be unwilling to take on the
representation of franchisors, or, if they are willing to represent franchisors, 
they may increase the cost of their services to offset the potential risk the 
representation poses.343  Moreover, an increase in the standards of 
franchising may result in a decrease in the availability of franchise 
lawyers.344  In order to avoid liability for nondisclosure, larger-franchised
companies may increasingly engage these attorneys to produce disclosure
documents,345 which, in return, may decrease the smaller franchisors’ 
abilities to obtain representation.346  Further, risk-averse lawyers “may
also decline to represent start-up franchisors whose business plans are
truly innovative and potentially highly successful but that lack records of
success to assure that they will not fail, leaving the lawyers to face angry
franchisees.”347  As a result, some would-be franchisees may be deprived
of a potential opportunity for success because of this lack of support for
franchisor innovation.348 
339. Id. (citing Spandorf, supra note 338, at 51, 53). Such criticisms have long
been voiced, particularly in the aftermath of the decision in Courtney v. Waring, 237 Cal. 
Rptr. 233, 239 (Ct. App. 1987), which held a franchisor’s lawyer liable to a nonclient. 
See Spandorf, supra note 338, at 51–53. 
340. Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 64. 
341. That would certainly be the case if, in a potential investor’s action, the court 
decides such information might be deemed “material.” Id.
 342. See id.
 343. See id.
 344. See id.
345. That ultimately shifts the burden from the franchisor to the attorney.  Even if
the franchisor was liable, the franchisor could seek indemnification from the attorney via
a malpractice claim. See id.
 346. See id. at 65. 






























B. Why Better Disclosure Requirements Should Be Adopted
Another possibility for addressing the uncounseled franchisee problem 
would be to create more robust disclosure requirements in franchise law. 
Rather than place liability on a franchisor’s lawyer to inform the
franchisee, a solution would be to include more explicit warnings in 
disclosure documents to impress upon the franchisee the importance of
seeking counsel before signing a franchise agreement.349  Currently, the
FTC does not require the franchisor to provide recommendations to the 
nonclient franchisee to obtain counsel in its disclosure documents.350 
However, as in other areas of law, this type of disclosure could be the
key to addressing and combating the various psychological reasons— 
overconfidence, overoptimism, and general incompetence—behind why
franchisees do not obtain counsel, and thus limit the harmful effects of 
uncounseled franchisees.351 
Although these personality traits—especially optimism and confidence— 
can positively affect business ventures, Dunning cautions there is “a dark
side to our chronic optimism.  It can lead to actual harm.”352  This caution is
equally true in the area of franchise law and is a major argument for why 
better disclosures are needed to impress upon franchisees the need to
seek counsel. 
349. One practitioner sees unrepresented franchisees as a less than desirable 
situation and would prefer to see more franchisees secure representation.  Telephone
Interview with Robert T. Joseph, supra note 72.  He does not, however, feel it is his duty
to tell the unrepresented franchisee to do so.  Id. In his view, telling unrepresented 
franchisees to seek counsel would impose a legal duty upon him that, at least under the
current law, does not exist.  Id.
 350. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 436–37 (2013). Internationally, however, this is not the 
case. In Australia, for example, the franchise agreement cannot be signed unless the 
franchisor receives signed statements from the franchisee stating that the franchisee 
received independent legal or business advice related to the franchise agreement or chose 
not to do so. See Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations 1998
(Cth) s 11 pt 2 (Austl.); see also Stephen Giles & Rupert M. Barkoff, Australian 
Franchise Law: How To Avoid Being a Shrimp on the Australian Franchising Barbecue, 
29 FRANCHISE L.J. 164, 171 (2010) (discussing how franchisors in Australia “must
recommend that franchisees seek independent legal and business advice”).
351. Even more disclosures may not limit these harmful effects if the franchisees 
simply fail to read the disclosures.  When this occurs, some practitioners question how 
much the law should protect franchisees who do not read their own contracts.  Telephone
Interview with Rochelle Spandorf, supra note 109. 
352. Spiegel, supra note 89. For example, Dunning explains, “Doctors, confident 
that they understand an illness, will fail to refer a patient to a specialist,” or “elderly
drivers who are brought in for an evaluation [often] say they are above average drivers” 
but “are four times more likely at the end of the evaluation to be labeled as unsafe as
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On the other hand, better disclosures for franchise agreements may not 
be helpful in convincing franchisees to obtain counsel.  The same 
psychological reasons that underlie a franchisee’s decision not to seek
counsel—overconfidence and over-optimism—may negate the positive 
effects of better disclosures.353  People tend to process information in 
“self-serving” ways, meaning that if an individual is biased towards one 
viewpoint, that individual may process information to lead to his “desired 
conclusion.”354  Thus, an overconfident and overly optimistic franchisee 
may only mentally process information that is favorable to signing the 
franchise agreement while mentally disregarding any warnings that
indicate the contrary.  If the public policy of better disclosure is to impress 
upon the franchisee the need to obtain counsel, but the franchisee does not
heed the advice, then better disclosures would be an exercise in futility.355 
As previously discussed, all parties may suffer from an inexperienced 
franchisee conducting the transaction without the assistance of counsel.
The more obviously aggrieved party is the franchisee itself. Without 
knowing the business nor the intricacies and requirements of enfranchising 
a business, it may be venturing down a slippery slope.  However, the
franchisee is not the only party who may be injured by its actions.  Both 
the franchisor and the franchisor’s attorney may suffer from the
franchisee’s inexperience.  If a court decides to protect the franchisee
from his inexperience, the entire franchise agreement may be voidable. 
If the contract is voided, the franchisor’s attorney could face repercussions 
from their client, as well as from the franchisee as a third-party beneficiary 
to the attorney’s services.  Essentially, the franchisee’s decision to represent 
itself can produce injurious consequences for all parties involved. 
353. See Williams, supra note 82, at 734–35. 
354. See id. at 746–47. 
355. At least one leading franchise law practitioner agrees.  Because franchises are 
business arrangements with no fiduciary duty, more disclosure may not be effective if 
the franchisee does not read and, more importantly, understand the disclosure
documents. Telephone Interview with Robert T. Joseph, supra note 72.  According to
the practitioner, if the franchisee fails either to read and understand the documents or to 
obtain a lawyer to assist him in doing so, and later the franchisee sues the franchisor, at 
the franchisee’s deposition the first question the franchisee will be asked is whether or
not he received the disclosure documents.  Id.  If the answer is “yes,” then he will be 
asked two questions: whether he read the disclosure documents and, if so, whether he
understood them.  Id.  Depending on how the franchisee answers these two questions, he 






















   
  
   
  




   
 
  
   
Furthermore, although requiring better disclosures for franchisees 
generally favors the plight of the franchisee, it may lead to unintended 
results, such as harmful market effects to the franchise system. Franchisor 
lawyer William Killion argues against an interpretation of franchise laws 
that favors the franchisee.356  Killion notes that the disparity between 
franchisors and franchisees may not be a problem but simply market
competition.357  Increasing the regulation of franchises, when current 
regulation is expansive in its disclosures and franchisees are arguably 
more sophisticated than ever before, would favor the franchisee by
potentially “bail[ing] franchisees out of bad business decisions.”358 
Furthermore, Killion believes that expanding regulation of the franchise 
market will lead to harmful economic results for franchisors, franchisees, 
and the millions of people who rely upon the franchise system.359  Often,
the actions of the franchisor, which may be harmful to the franchisee, are 
beneficial to the public, such as the franchisor’s bargaining for terms that
keep the cost of the franchise’s “product” down.360  In other words, the
effects of more franchise regulation, including disclosures, could leave 
the economy, on balance, in a worse position than before.361  If public
policy is to protect the franchisee, franchisor, and economy from the 
negative effects of an uneven agreement,362 and if more regulation will
serve to exacerbate the problem in other ways, then perhaps more regulation 
is not the answer.363 
Nevertheless, considering the current negative impact of uncounseled 
franchisees, commentators agree that prospective franchisees need better
protection through amendments to franchise laws, by either creating a 
private right of action or requiring better disclosures.364  For example,  
356. See Killion, supra note 10, at 24. 
357.  See id. 
 358. See id. at 31. 
359. See id. at 29. 
360. See id.
361. However, disclosure can be “conducive to economic efficiency,” by ensuring
that those who invest in potential franchises are best suited and completely informed of 
the requirements for franchising. See Meiklejohn, supra note 305, at 63. 
362. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
363. One leading franchise lawyer argues that franchisees are not nearly as
unsophisticated as they were forty years ago, and that current laws requiring a franchise 
disclosure document notifying the prospective franchisee to seek counsel, along with a 
mandatory cooling off period, are more than sufficient to protect prospective franchisees
and prevent overreaching.  Telephone Interview with Rochelle Spandorf, supra note 109. 
Thus, if a prospective franchisee is uninformed or without counsel, it is by choice and 
not some flaw in the current regulations.  Id. Rules should not automatically place a 
lawyer at the hip of every businessman or woman.  Id.
364. Such a proposal is already enforced abroad.  For example, in Ontario, Canada, 
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Peter C. Lagarias and Robert S. Boulter, partners in Lagarias & Boulter, 
argue that some form of better franchisee protection is needed, considering 
the “abuses of the free market economy.”365  Similarly, according to Paul 
Steinberg and Gerald Lescatre, both involved in franchising operations 
with Subway Sandwiches and Salads, “[f]ranchise regulation will never 
serve as a panacea for postsale abusive practices by franchisors.”366 
Professors Debra Burke and E. Malcolm Abel II suggest a private right
of action explicitly for franchisees who have been misled by a franchisor’s
misleading statements or failure to disclose; an action that may be both 
remedial for the franchisee and a deterrent for the franchisor in future
franchise negotiations.367 
Additionally, the argument to increase the number or degree of
disclosures to a contracting party is not novel considering the prevalence 
of disclosure requirements in other areas of law.368  Based on the rampant 
use of disclosure rules in consumer, real estate, and marriage law, it may
be argued that the best method for dealing with uncounseled franchisees,
in conformity with a regulatory framework suitable to providing additional 
protections, is to require more from the franchisor, such as disclosing 
more information to prospective franchisees about the importance of 
seeking independent counsel.369  New disclosures could take the form of
an acknowledgement that the franchisee is fully aware of the potential
issues that could arise from not seeking counsel in the franchise negotiation 
process and the signing of the agreement.  The acknowledgement need 
not constitute the waiver of a franchisee’s right to sue the franchisor for 
misrepresentations or otherwise but should emphasize the need to have 
lawyers review the documents and thereby negate the current impact of
uncounseled franchisees on franchised networks and the courts. The 
notice would explicitly remind would-be franchisees that what they are
and also to afford franchisees a private right of action against franchisors for
misrepresentation or statutory noncompliance.  See Arthur Wishart (Franchise Disclosure) 
Act, R.S.O. 2000, c. P.3 §§ 5(1), 7(1) (Can.); see also Kaufmann, supra note 322, at 
117–18 (discussing Canadian franchise laws). 
365. Peter C. Lagarias & Robert S. Boulter, The Modern Reality of the Controlling 
Franchisor: The Case for More, Not Less, Franchisee Protections, 29 FRANCHISE L.J.
139, 139 (2010). 
366.  Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 20, at 313. 
367. See Burke & Abel, supra note 285, at 384. 
368. See supra notes 295–302 and accompanying text. 



















   
 









about to sign merits the expert guidance of a franchise attorney.370   For 
example, the warning could say: 
Before agreeing to become a franchisee, you should consult with an experienced
franchise lawyer.  As a practical matter, including a long-term savings of time 
and money, your hiring that lawyer at the outset is almost always a “must.” 
Do not trust in your ability, or the ability of others, to decide whether you need
a lawyer’s assistance for something this important.  Just as a new but persistent
physical ailment should lead you, as a matter of personal health, to do more than
just treat it yourself but to see a medical doctor, so you, when buying a
franchise, should not “go it alone.”  To proceed without a lawyer, you simply do
not know enough about this franchise, the legal nature of the franchise documents,
and the many relevant laws. 
The nature of professional expertise (medicine, law, etc.) is that even an
otherwise very smart and experienced individual, if not a professional in that 
field, needs professional assistance.  Also, your lack of training and experience 
in law likely makes you unable to assess whether and how a legal expert (a 
franchise lawyer) could help you.  So, no matter how smart or experienced you 
may be generally or even for this particular type of business, you probably
cannot accurately weigh the costs of “going it alone” versus paying for legal 
counsel. Very often in hindsight, a franchisee who failed to hire a lawyer
deeply regrets that he or she did not hire a lawyer at the outset.
If properly formulated and distributed, such a warning could operate quite 
well. Franchisees would not just be better advised; the result would include 
the beneficial side effects of fairer franchise agreements and reduced
litigation.371 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In certain limited instances, the franchisor and its attorney owe an
unrepresented franchisee a duty of care during the negotiations of a new 
franchise.372 While still owing a duty of zealous representation to his
own client, the franchisor’s attorney need not myopically fix his gaze 
upon just his clients.  Rather, the attorney must not overlook any unfair 
consequences of the transaction for an unrepresented franchisee.
370. Australia mandates even more from franchisors in that not only must warnings 
be given, but prospective franchisees must also, with a signed writing, indicate that they
retained independent legal advice or knowingly rejected it.  Giles & Barkoff, supra note 
350, at 169. 
371. See Giles & Barkoff, supra note 350, at 171 (stating that Australia’s required
warning and acknowledgement by franchisees “may sound unwieldy, or perhaps
paternalistic, to U.S. lawyers, but it operates well in practice”).  For example, this
admonition could be displayed on the cover page of any disclosure document furnished
to prospective franchisees.
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However, to place the burden of disclosure squarely upon a franchisor’s
attorney is a drastic, and likely legally inconsistent, conclusion.
Considering the conflicts that would arise in holding lawyers liable for 
failing to inform the franchisee, or, conversely, informing it of too much,
such as the franchisor-client’s confidential, proprietary information, the 
solution to the uncounseled franchisee problem comes in the form of a 
written warning or acknowledgement in the disclosure documents submitted 
by franchisors to potential franchisees. In this way, a franchisee can be 
forewarned or put on notice of the importance of obtaining counsel without
imposing any substantial duty on a party.  Indeed, this method for dealing 
with uncounseled franchisees conforms to a regulatory framework
already emphasizing disclosure between the franchisor and franchisee.
More disclosure is a relatively burden-free imposition on franchisors to 
counter the foibles of falsely confident prospective franchisees ready to
make long-term, irrevocable commitments. 
Common law contract principles, as evidenced in the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, set forth several reasons why a franchisee’s lack
of counsel often should void an agreement.  These reasons include 
incapacity, undue influence, duress, fraud, and unconscionability.373 A 
franchisor should not be permitted to obtain a windfall from dealing with 
unrepresented franchisees.
Most franchisees cannot rightly be considered sophisticated investors 
who have knowingly entered into a franchise agreement.  Ordinarily,
franchisees ought not to be bound by the agreement. Indeed, many
courts have ruled that when the franchisee has no business experience
and reasonably relies on the franchisor’s statements to his detriment, the 
franchise agreement may be voided as if the franchisor intended the 
mischief to take advantage of the franchisee’s inexperience.374  In these 
cases, as a practical matter, courts already hold franchisees with business
experience to a higher standard than franchisees without that background 
or knowledge.375 
373. See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. 
374. In other words, a court may void the contract, even if there was no wrongful
intent on the franchisor’s part, only harmful consequences to the franchisee.  See supra
note 300 and accompanying text.
375. Compare Payne v. McDonald’s Corp., 957 F. Supp. 749, 761 (D. Md. 1997) 
(noting that reliance on the franchisor’s statements was unreasonable due to the
franchisee’s knowledge of the restaurant business), with Fisher v. Mr. Harold’s Hair Lab,































The would-be franchisee’s need for an attorney is critical.  During a 
franchise’s formative stages, however, many franchise applicants simply
“go bare,” that is, proceed without counsel. Lawyers for the franchisor 
recognize that this is extremely problematic for the potential franchisee,
and that it often impairs the franchise relationship and even the long-
term interests of the franchisor.  There are psychological reasons behind 
a franchisee’s failure to consult an attorney before proceeding to the
bargaining process and investing time and money in a franchise.  Many 
franchisees believe themselves capable of self-representation. If a
franchisee thinks it can represent itself, should additional protections be
implemented to protect it from its own inexperience?  The particularly
confounding aspect of this state of affairs is that the investors who most
need the assistance of a legal expert are the ones whose limited skills
and self-awareness make them the least likely to realize that fact.  They
misjudge the situation and—much more so than a comparatively
sophisticated businessperson—overestimate their ability to understand
legal concepts and to negotiate terms.  These self-inflicted injuries cannot 
be remedied without any side effects.  Indeed, a cure for such a deep-
rooted, psychologically based quandary may be worse than the “disease.”376 
Still, the absence of an obvious systemic solution does not make the
predicament any less real; the wisest, most experienced people in 
franchising—typically franchisors and legal counsel—should openly
acknowledge the problem.377  In some circles, the fact that many new
franchisees are unschooled and, in a sense, their own worst enemy is 
apparently an open secret known to everyone but the franchisees 
themselves.  They, of course, may learn this fact later, but only after they 
become ensnared in a business or legal dilemma.  At this point, however,
the damage is already done.  Although the franchisees cannot evade
responsibility for these problems, which are certainly, in part, their own 
making, the resultant difficulties often spill over into problems for the
system as a whole—the other franchisees and the franchisor itself.
Hence, there is, at the very least, the need for more effective notification
about the franchisee’s need for counsel.  Forewarned is, indeed, forearmed. 
business reasonably relied on the franchisor’s statements).  These cases and principles 
are discussed in Parts III.A and III.B., supra. 
376. On the individual level, there is no miraculous balm to treat the injuries
incurred due to ignorance.  As for a universal perspective, there is no overall solution; 
for example, one cannot increase the franchisee’s opportunity to use her ignorance as an
excuse to thereby evade otherwise binding contractual duties without decreasing the 
ability of franchisors and others to rely on the deals they make with franchisees. 
377. More so than potential or new franchisees, these persons are most likely to 



















[VOL. 51: 709, 2014] Fortune Favors the Franchisor 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
VIII. APPENDIX – COPY OF SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
Figures derived in response are in bold. 
Dear ___________,  
Information and Consent to Survey
My name is _______.  I am a business law professor at _______. I am 
studying the degree to which franchise parties are represented by counsel 
in the franchise agreement negotiation and signing process.  To that end, 
I have developed a short survey (16 questions), which should take about 
five to ten minutes for you to complete.
. . . . 
The Survey
I understand that you are a lawyer who practices law on behalf of one 
or more franchisors.  You are, I am sure, a very busy professional. As a
former litigator, I am quite aware of the pressing demands on a lawyer’s
time.  So, I just want you to know how much I appreciate your time and
help.  The information you and others provide will, I believe, be most
useful. 
Please just respond to this e-mail by pressing “Reply,” typing your
answers directly herein, and then sending your letter back to me at
___________.  Again, thank you! 
1. In the past two years, while acting on behalf of a franchisor, how 
many franchise “closings” did you attend or otherwise participate in, 
supervise, or review? 1607 
By closing, I mean the process in which the franchisor and 
franchisee, perhaps at a meeting (but not necessarily in such a face-to-face 
conference), sign the franchise agreement and perhaps related
documents. NOTE: If you did not personally attend one or more of the 
closings but know about those closings in your role as a supervisor of 














role as counsel, please indicate such information (discuss those closings/ 
transactions) in your answers.  Thank you. 
2. For how many of these closings from Question 1 was the franchisee 
represented by counsel? 419 (26.07%)
The Questions 3-10 now deal with these closings—the number answered
for Question 2—in which a lawyer represented the franchisee. 
3. How many franchisees had, in your estimate, lawyers who engaged in 
negotiation of the franchise terms, seeking more favorable terms for 
the franchisee? 310 — 73.99% of those times (419, answer 2, 
above) where the franchisee had a lawyer 
4. How many franchisees instead had, in your estimate, lawyers who 
simply advised the franchisee, but did not negotiate with the 
franchisor? 104 —24.82% of the times (419, answer 2, above) 
where the franchisee had a lawyer 
5. If there were one or more franchise lawyers for whom you simply 
cannot recall their role, between Question 3 and Question 4, please 
give that number here. 5  (re: franchisees with a lawyer, 1.19% 
unsure/cannot recall as to whether the lawyer engaged in 
negotiations or simply advised the franchisee) 
The answers to Questions 3 and 4 and 5 should add up to the number 
given in response to Question 2.
6. In your estimate, how many franchisees had a lawyer whose quality 
of representation was (state a number for each of the six answers 
immediately below)? 
Excellent 41 (9.79%) 
Very Good 167 (39.86%)
Good 108 (25.78%)
Fair 87 (20.76%) 
Poor 16 (3.82%)
The total of the numbers given should add up to the number given in 
response to Question 2. 
7. If you can, for each time period below, state how many of the 
franchisees had a lawyer who had been their counsel, before the
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Less than a week  30 (7.16%) 
1 to 4 weeks  48 (11.46%)
1 to 6 months  10 (2.39%) 
Over 6 months  88 (21.0%)  
DID NOT KNOW  243 (58.0%)
The answers to Question 7 should add up to no more than the number 
given in response to Question 2.  If it is less than the answer given to 
Question 2, the assumption will be that the difference represents those 
franchisees for which you have no idea about how long their lawyer had
represented them.  That is what the 243, above, is.
8. Concerning the franchisee lawyers’ experience with franchising, 
please give the number of such lawyers with: 
A very high level of experience, with many previous times 
advising prospective franchisees 40 (9.55%) 
Some experience—having represented at least a few
other prospective franchisees 53 (12.65%)
Little experience in franchising, having counseled 
just one or two franchisees previously 37 (8.83%)
No such experience before that franchisee 48 (11.46%) 
DID NOT KNOW 241 (57.52%)
Again, the answers to Question 8 should add up to no more than the 
number given in response to Question 2.  If it is less than the answer 
given to Question 2, the assumption will be that the difference represents 
those lawyers for whom you have no idea about their experience with
franchising. That is what the 241, above, is. 
9. Concerning the franchisee lawyers’ experience with your particular 
industry (e.g., hotels, restaurants, hair care, retail stores, real estate, 
travel), please give the number where the franchisee counsel’s level 
of experience was: 
Very high, with many previous times advising clients 
about matters involving the industry 117 (27.92%)
775




















Some, having at least 3 or 4 previous clients involved in 
my industry 61 (14.56%) 
Little, having just 1 or 2 previous clients in 
my industry 92 (21.96%)
None before that franchisee 34 (8.11%)
DID NOT KNOW 115 (27.45%)
Again, the answers to Question 9 should add up to no more than the 
number given in response to Question 2.  If it is less than the answer 
given to Question 2, the assumption will be that the difference represents 
those lawyers for whom you have no idea about their experience with
clients in your industry. That is what the 115, above, is. 
10. For how many years have you practiced law concerning franchised 
enterprises? 16 years mean; 15 years median 
Questions 11–13 ask for your impressions about the percentage of
represented franchisees and the sophistication of that representation? 
11. In the past ten years (or however long you have practiced franchise 
law, if that period is shorter), the percentage of franchisees represented 
by lawyers at closings has: 
Increased 24.1% of respondents (representing 32.05% 
of franchised units for which there was a response)
Stayed about the same 51.1% of respondents (representing 
67.95% of franchised units for which there was a 
response)
Decreased None of the respondents
12. In the past ten years (or however long you have practiced franchise 
law, if that period is shorter), would you estimate that the franchise 
law sophistication of franchisee lawyers has: 
Increased 43.44% of respondents (representing 57.41% 
of franchised units for which there was a response)
Stayed about the same 32.22% of respondents (representing 
42.59% of franchised units for which there was a 
response)
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13. In the past ten years (or however long you have practiced franchise 
law, if that period is shorter), the business sophistication of 
franchisees has: 
Increased 53.22% of respondents (representing 70.79% 
of franchised units for which there was a response) 
Stayed about the same 21.96% of respondents (representing 
29.2% of franchised units for which there was a 
response)
Decreased None of the respondents
14. For the closings from Question 1, were any franchisees-to-be the 
beneficiaries of a standard form contract negotiated by the 
franchisor and a franchisee association? 
Yes ______ 28.16% of respondents (representing 
37.69% of franchised units for which there was a 
response)
No______46.54% of respondents (representing 62.3%
of franchised units for which there was a response)
15. Do you have any other information you would like to impart? Please 
write starting here, using as much space as you would like. 
Reported in article by author
16. Would you like me (the professor) to call or write to you? 
I very much appreciate your assistance.
777
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